let queryfrequency = 30m;
let accountthreshold = 10;
let successCodes = dynamic([0, 50144]);
ADFSSignInLogs
| extend IngestionTime = ingestion_time()
| where IngestionTime > ago(queryfrequency)
| where not(todynamic(AuthenticationDetails)[0].authenticationMethod == "Integrated Windows Authentication")
| summarize
DistinctFailureCount = dcountif(UserPrincipalName, ResultType !in (successCodes)),
DistinctSuccessCount = dcountif(UserPrincipalName, ResultType in (successCodes)),
SuccessAccounts = make_set_if(UserPrincipalName, ResultType in (successCodes), 250),
arg_min(TimeGenerated, *)
by IPAddress
| where DistinctFailureCount > DistinctSuccessCount and DistinctFailureCount >= accountthreshold
//| extend SuccessAccounts = iff(array_length(SuccessAccounts) != 0, SuccessAccounts, dynamic(["null"]))
//| mv-expand SuccessAccounts
| project TimeGenerated, Category, OperationName, IPAddress, DistinctFailureCount, DistinctSuccessCount, SuccessAccounts, AuthenticationRequirement, ConditionalAccessStatus, IsInteractive, UserAgent, NetworkLocationDetails, DeviceDetail, TokenIssuerType, TokenIssuerName, ResourceIdentity
status: Available
relevantTechniques:
- T1110
id: 5533fe80-905e-49d5-889a-df27d2c3976d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Microsoft Entra ID/Analytic Rules/ADFSSignInLogsPasswordSpray.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- ADFSSignInLogs
connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
version: 1.0.2
severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
name: Password spray attack against ADFSSignInLogs
queryPeriod: 1h
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: IPAddress
entityType: IP
queryFrequency: 30m
query: |
let queryfrequency = 30m;
let accountthreshold = 10;
let successCodes = dynamic([0, 50144]);
ADFSSignInLogs
| extend IngestionTime = ingestion_time()
| where IngestionTime > ago(queryfrequency)
| where not(todynamic(AuthenticationDetails)[0].authenticationMethod == "Integrated Windows Authentication")
| summarize
DistinctFailureCount = dcountif(UserPrincipalName, ResultType !in (successCodes)),
DistinctSuccessCount = dcountif(UserPrincipalName, ResultType in (successCodes)),
SuccessAccounts = make_set_if(UserPrincipalName, ResultType in (successCodes), 250),
arg_min(TimeGenerated, *)
by IPAddress
| where DistinctFailureCount > DistinctSuccessCount and DistinctFailureCount >= accountthreshold
//| extend SuccessAccounts = iff(array_length(SuccessAccounts) != 0, SuccessAccounts, dynamic(["null"]))
//| mv-expand SuccessAccounts
| project TimeGenerated, Category, OperationName, IPAddress, DistinctFailureCount, DistinctSuccessCount, SuccessAccounts, AuthenticationRequirement, ConditionalAccessStatus, IsInteractive, UserAgent, NetworkLocationDetails, DeviceDetail, TokenIssuerType, TokenIssuerName, ResourceIdentity
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
kind: Scheduled
description: |
'Identifies evidence of password spray activity against Connect Health for AD FS sign-in events by looking for failures from multiple accounts from the same IP address within a time window. Reference: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Microsoft%20Entra%20ID/ADFSSignInLogsPasswordSpray.md'
triggerOperator: gt