AdminSDHolder Modifications

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Id	52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea
Rulename	AdminSDHolder Modifications
Description	This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory. This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder. Ref: https://attack.stealthbits.com/adminsdholder-modification-ad-persistence
Severity	High
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1078
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/AdminSDHolder_Modifications.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea.json

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[0])

YAML

queryPeriod: 1h
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: SubjectAccount
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: Name
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: NTDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: HostNameDomain
  entityType: Host
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
id: 52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea
triggerOperator: gt
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
  author:
    name: Vasileios Paschalidis
  source:
    kind: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
  support:
    tier: Community
query: |
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
  | parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[0])  
tactics:
- Persistence
triggerThreshold: 0
queryFrequency: 1h
description: |
  'This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder  in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. 
  AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory.
  This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder.
  Ref: https://attack.stealthbits.com/adminsdholder-modification-ad-persistence'  
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/AdminSDHolder_Modifications.yaml
name: AdminSDHolder Modifications
version: 1.0.4

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder  in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. \nAdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory.\nThis query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder.\nRef: https://attack.stealthbits.com/adminsdholder-modification-ad-persistence'\n",
        "displayName": "AdminSDHolder Modifications",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectAccount",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "Name",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "NTDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/AdminSDHolder_Modifications.yaml",
        "query": "SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains \"<Data Name=\\\"ObjectDN\\\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System\"\n| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN\">' ObjectDN \"<\" *\n| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, \"\\\\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, \"\\\\\")[0])\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "High",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.4",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}