Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
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AdminSDHolder Modifications

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Id52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea
RulenameAdminSDHolder Modifications
DescriptionThis query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence.

AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory.

This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder.

Ref: https://attack.stealthbits.com/adminsdholder-modification-ad-persistence
SeverityHigh
TacticsPersistence
TechniquesT1078
Required data connectorsSecurityEvents
KindScheduled
Query frequency1h
Query period1h
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/AdminSDHolder_Modifications.yaml
Version1.0.2
Arm template52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea.json
Deploy To Azure
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
version: 1.0.2
queryFrequency: 1h
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SubjectAccount
    identifier: FullName
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Computer
    identifier: FullName
  entityType: Host
kind: Scheduled
queryPeriod: 1h
severity: High
query: |
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
  | parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN  
metadata:
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
  author:
    name: Vasileios Paschalidis
  support:
    tier: Community
  source:
    kind: Community
triggerOperator: gt
id: 52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea
description: |
  'This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder  in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. 
  AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory.
  This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder.
  Ref: https://attack.stealthbits.com/adminsdholder-modification-ad-persistence'  
triggerThreshold: 0
name: AdminSDHolder Modifications
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
tactics:
- Persistence
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/AdminSDHolder_Modifications.yaml
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea')]",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea')]",
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "apiVersion": "2022-11-01",
      "properties": {
        "displayName": "AdminSDHolder Modifications",
        "description": "'This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder  in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. \nAdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory.\nThis query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder.\nRef: https://attack.stealthbits.com/adminsdholder-modification-ad-persistence'\n",
        "severity": "High",
        "enabled": true,
        "query": "SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains \"<Data Name=\\\"ObjectDN\\\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System\"\n| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN\">' ObjectDN \"<\" *\n| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0,
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea",
        "customDetails": null,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "identifier": "FullName",
                "columnName": "SubjectAccount"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "identifier": "FullName",
                "columnName": "Computer"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/AdminSDHolder_Modifications.yaml",
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2"
      }
    }
  ]
}