AdminSDHolder Modifications

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Id	52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea
Rulename	AdminSDHolder Modifications
Description	This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory. This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder. Ref: https://attack.stealthbits.com/adminsdholder-modification-ad-persistence
Severity	High
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1078
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/AdminSDHolder_Modifications.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea.json

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[0])

YAML

queryPeriod: 1h
query: |
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
  | parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[0])  
name: AdminSDHolder Modifications
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SubjectAccount
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: Name
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: NTDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Computer
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/AdminSDHolder_Modifications.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
description: |
  'This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder  in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. 
  AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory.
  This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder.
  Ref: https://attack.stealthbits.com/adminsdholder-modification-ad-persistence'  
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.4
metadata:
  author:
    name: Vasileios Paschalidis
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
  support:
    tier: Community
  source:
    kind: Community
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: High
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Persistence
id: 52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea

ARM