Identify SysAid Server web shell creation
Id | 50eb4cbd-188f-44f4-b964-bab84dcdec10 |
Rulename | Identify SysAid Server web shell creation |
Description | This query looks for potential webshell creation by the threat actor Mercury after the sucessful exploitation of SysAid server. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/ |
Severity | High |
Tactics | InitialAccess |
Techniques | T1190 |
Required data connectors | MicrosoftThreatProtection SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Web Shells Threat Protection/Analytic Rules/PotentialMercury_Webshell.yaml |
Version | 1.0.3 |
Arm template | 50eb4cbd-188f-44f4-b964-bab84dcdec10.json |
let timeframe = 1d;
let time_window = 5m;
(union isfuzzy=true
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process has_any ("java.exe", "javaw.exe") and CommandLine has "SysAidServer"
| summarize by ParentProcessName,Process, Account, Computer, CommandLine, timekey= bin(TimeGenerated, time_window), TimeGenerated, SubjectLogonId
| join kind=inner(
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4663
| where Process has_any ("java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| where AccessMask in ('0x2','0x100', '0x10', '0x4')
| where ObjectName endswith ".jsp"
| summarize by ParentProcessName, Account, Computer, ObjectName, ProcessName, timekey= bin(TimeGenerated, time_window), TimeGenerated, SubjectLogonId)
on timekey, Computer, SubjectLogonId
),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "SysAidServer"
| where FileName endswith ".jsp"
| extend Account = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, @'\', InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName
),
(imFileEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventType == "FileCreated"
| where ActingProcessName has_any ("java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| where ActingProcessCommandLine has "SysAidServer"
| where FilePath endswith ".jsp"
| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname
)
)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
relevantTechniques:
- T1190
name: Identify SysAid Server web shell creation
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- DeviceFileEvents
connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Account
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: AccountNTDomain
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
entityType: Host
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 50eb4cbd-188f-44f4-b964-bab84dcdec10
tactics:
- InitialAccess
version: 1.0.3
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Web Shells Threat Protection/Analytic Rules/PotentialMercury_Webshell.yaml
queryPeriod: 1d
kind: Scheduled
tags:
- Mercury
- Schema: ASIMFileEvent
SchemaVersion: 0.1.0
metadata:
categories:
domains:
- Security - Others
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
support:
tier: Community
source:
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1d
severity: High
description: |
'This query looks for potential webshell creation by the threat actor Mercury after the sucessful exploitation of SysAid server.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
query: |
let timeframe = 1d;
let time_window = 5m;
(union isfuzzy=true
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process has_any ("java.exe", "javaw.exe") and CommandLine has "SysAidServer"
| summarize by ParentProcessName,Process, Account, Computer, CommandLine, timekey= bin(TimeGenerated, time_window), TimeGenerated, SubjectLogonId
| join kind=inner(
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4663
| where Process has_any ("java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| where AccessMask in ('0x2','0x100', '0x10', '0x4')
| where ObjectName endswith ".jsp"
| summarize by ParentProcessName, Account, Computer, ObjectName, ProcessName, timekey= bin(TimeGenerated, time_window), TimeGenerated, SubjectLogonId)
on timekey, Computer, SubjectLogonId
),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "SysAidServer"
| where FileName endswith ".jsp"
| extend Account = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, @'\', InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName
),
(imFileEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventType == "FileCreated"
| where ActingProcessName has_any ("java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| where ActingProcessCommandLine has "SysAidServer"
| where FilePath endswith ".jsp"
| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname
)
)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
triggerOperator: gt
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/50eb4cbd-188f-44f4-b964-bab84dcdec10')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/50eb4cbd-188f-44f4-b964-bab84dcdec10')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "50eb4cbd-188f-44f4-b964-bab84dcdec10",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This query looks for potential webshell creation by the threat actor Mercury after the sucessful exploitation of SysAid server. \nReference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'\n",
"displayName": "Identify SysAid Server web shell creation",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Account",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountNTDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Computer",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostName",
"identifier": "HostName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostNameDomain",
"identifier": "DnsDomain"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Web Shells Threat Protection/Analytic Rules/PotentialMercury_Webshell.yaml",
"query": "let timeframe = 1d;\nlet time_window = 5m;\n(union isfuzzy=true\n(SecurityEvent\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where Process has_any (\"java.exe\", \"javaw.exe\") and CommandLine has \"SysAidServer\" \n| summarize by ParentProcessName,Process, Account, Computer, CommandLine, timekey= bin(TimeGenerated, time_window), TimeGenerated, SubjectLogonId\n| join kind=inner(\nSecurityEvent\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n| where EventID == 4663\n| where Process has_any (\"java.exe\", \"javaw.exe\")\n| where AccessMask in ('0x2','0x100', '0x10', '0x4')\n| where ObjectName endswith \".jsp\" \n| summarize by ParentProcessName, Account, Computer, ObjectName, ProcessName, timekey= bin(TimeGenerated, time_window), TimeGenerated, SubjectLogonId)\n on timekey, Computer, SubjectLogonId\n),\n(DeviceFileEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (\"java.exe\", \"javaw.exe\") \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has \"SysAidServer\" \n| where FileName endswith \".jsp\" \n| extend Account = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, @'\\', InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName\n),\n(imFileEvent\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n| where EventType == \"FileCreated\"\n| where ActingProcessName has_any (\"java.exe\", \"javaw.exe\") \n| where ActingProcessCommandLine has \"SysAidServer\" \n| where FilePath endswith \".jsp\" \n| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname\n)\n)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\\')[0])\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "High",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"InitialAccess"
],
"tags": [
"Mercury",
{
"Schema": "ASIMFileEvent",
"SchemaVersion": "0.1.0"
}
],
"techniques": [
"T1190"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.3",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}