New Agent Added to Pool by New User or Added to a New OS Type

Back


Id	4ce177b3-56b1-4f0e-b83e-27eed4cb0b16
Rulename	New Agent Added to Pool by New User or Added to a New OS Type
Description	As seen in attacks such as SolarWinds attackers can look to subvert a build process by controlling build servers. Azure DevOps uses agent pools to execute pipeline tasks. An attacker could insert compromised agents that they control into the pools in order to execute malicious code. This query looks for users adding agents to pools they have not added agents to before, or adding agents to a pool of an OS that has not been added to that pool before. This detection has potential for false positives so has a configurable allow list to allow for certain users to be excluded from the logic.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1053
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	14d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/AzureDevOpsAuditing/Analytic Rules/NewAgentAddedToPoolbyNewUserorofNewOS.yaml
Version	1.0.6
Arm template	4ce177b3-56b1-4f0e-b83e-27eed4cb0b16.json

KQL

let lookback = 14d;
let timeframe = 1d;
// exclude allowed users from query such as the ADO service
let allowed_users = dynamic(["Azure DevOps Service"]);
union
// Look for agents being added to a pool of a OS type not seen with that pool before
(ADOAuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback) and TimeGenerated < ago(timeframe)
| where OperationName =~ "Library.AgentAdded"
| where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)
| extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)
| extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)
| where isnotempty(OsDescription)
| extend OsDescription = tostring(split(OsDescription, "#", 0)[0])
| project AgentPoolName, OsDescription
| join kind=rightanti (ADOAuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where OperationName == "Library.AgentAdded"
| extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)
| extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)
| where isnotempty(OsDescription)
| extend OsDescription = tostring(split(OsDescription, "#", 0)[0])) on AgentPoolName, OsDescription),
// Look for users addeing agents to a pool that they have not added agents to before.
(AzureDevOpsAuditing
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback) and TimeGenerated < ago(timeframe)
| extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)
| where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)
| project AgentPoolName, ActorUPN
| join kind=rightanti (AzureDevOpsAuditing
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where OperationName == "Library.AgentAdded"
| where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)
| extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)
) on AgentPoolName, ActorUPN)
| extend AgentName = tostring(Data.AgentName)
| extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)
| extend SystemDetails = Data.SystemCapabilities
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, ScopeDisplayName, AgentPoolName, AgentName, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, OsDescription, SystemDetails, Data
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])

YAML

name: New Agent Added to Pool by New User or Added to a New OS Type
relevantTechniques:
- T1053
requiredDataConnectors: []
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/AzureDevOpsAuditing/Analytic Rules/NewAgentAddedToPoolbyNewUserorofNewOS.yaml
query: |
  let lookback = 14d;
  let timeframe = 1d;
  // exclude allowed users from query such as the ADO service
  let allowed_users = dynamic(["Azure DevOps Service"]);
  union
  // Look for agents being added to a pool of a OS type not seen with that pool before
  (ADOAuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback) and TimeGenerated < ago(timeframe)
  | where OperationName =~ "Library.AgentAdded"
  | where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)
  | extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)
  | extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)
  | where isnotempty(OsDescription)
  | extend OsDescription = tostring(split(OsDescription, "#", 0)[0])
  | project AgentPoolName, OsDescription
  | join kind=rightanti (ADOAuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
  | where OperationName == "Library.AgentAdded"
  | extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)
  | extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)
  | where isnotempty(OsDescription)
  | extend OsDescription = tostring(split(OsDescription, "#", 0)[0])) on AgentPoolName, OsDescription),
  // Look for users addeing agents to a pool that they have not added agents to before.
  (AzureDevOpsAuditing
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback) and TimeGenerated < ago(timeframe)
  | extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)
  | where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)
  | project AgentPoolName, ActorUPN
  | join kind=rightanti (AzureDevOpsAuditing
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
  | where OperationName == "Library.AgentAdded"
  | where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)
  | extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)
  ) on AgentPoolName, ActorUPN)
  | extend AgentName = tostring(Data.AgentName)
  | extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)
  | extend SystemDetails = Data.SystemCapabilities
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, ScopeDisplayName, AgentPoolName, AgentName, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, OsDescription, SystemDetails, Data
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])  
tactics:
- Execution
description: |
  'As seen in attacks such as SolarWinds attackers can look to subvert a build process by controlling build servers. Azure DevOps uses agent pools to execute pipeline tasks. 
  An attacker could insert compromised agents that they control into the pools in order to execute malicious code. This query looks for users adding agents to pools they have not added agents to before, or adding agents to a pool of an OS that has not been added to that pool before. This detection has potential for false positives so has a configurable allow list to allow for certain users to be excluded from the logic.'  
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: ActorUPN
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: IpAddress
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
version: 1.0.6
queryPeriod: 14d
status: Available
kind: Scheduled
severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 4ce177b3-56b1-4f0e-b83e-27eed4cb0b16

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/4ce177b3-56b1-4f0e-b83e-27eed4cb0b16')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/4ce177b3-56b1-4f0e-b83e-27eed4cb0b16')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "4ce177b3-56b1-4f0e-b83e-27eed4cb0b16",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'As seen in attacks such as SolarWinds attackers can look to subvert a build process by controlling build servers. Azure DevOps uses agent pools to execute pipeline tasks. \nAn attacker could insert compromised agents that they control into the pools in order to execute malicious code. This query looks for users adding agents to pools they have not added agents to before, or adding agents to a pool of an OS that has not been added to that pool before. This detection has potential for false positives so has a configurable allow list to allow for certain users to be excluded from the logic.'\n",
        "displayName": "New Agent Added to Pool by New User or Added to a New OS Type",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "ActorUPN",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/AzureDevOpsAuditing/Analytic Rules/NewAgentAddedToPoolbyNewUserorofNewOS.yaml",
        "query": "let lookback = 14d;\nlet timeframe = 1d;\n// exclude allowed users from query such as the ADO service\nlet allowed_users = dynamic([\"Azure DevOps Service\"]);\nunion\n// Look for agents being added to a pool of a OS type not seen with that pool before\n(ADOAuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback) and TimeGenerated < ago(timeframe)\n| where OperationName =~ \"Library.AgentAdded\"\n| where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)\n| extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)\n| extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)\n| where isnotempty(OsDescription)\n| extend OsDescription = tostring(split(OsDescription, \"#\", 0)[0])\n| project AgentPoolName, OsDescription\n| join kind=rightanti (ADOAuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n| where OperationName == \"Library.AgentAdded\"\n| extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)\n| extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)\n| where isnotempty(OsDescription)\n| extend OsDescription = tostring(split(OsDescription, \"#\", 0)[0])) on AgentPoolName, OsDescription),\n// Look for users addeing agents to a pool that they have not added agents to before.\n(AzureDevOpsAuditing\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback) and TimeGenerated < ago(timeframe)\n| extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)\n| where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)\n| project AgentPoolName, ActorUPN\n| join kind=rightanti (AzureDevOpsAuditing\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n| where OperationName == \"Library.AgentAdded\"\n| where ActorUPN !in (allowed_users)\n| extend AgentPoolName = tostring(Data.AgentPoolName)\n) on AgentPoolName, ActorUPN)\n| extend AgentName = tostring(Data.AgentName)\n| extend OsDescription = tostring(Data.OsDescription)\n| extend SystemDetails = Data.SystemCapabilities\n| project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, ScopeDisplayName, AgentPoolName, AgentName, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, OsDescription, SystemDetails, Data\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, \"@\")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, \"@\")[1])\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P14D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1053"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.6",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}