AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation with admin managed policy

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Id	49ce5322-60d7-4b02-ad79-99f650aa5790
Rulename	AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation with admin managed policy
Description	Detects successful attachment of admin-related managed IAM policies to users, roles, or groups, excluding the dedicated AdministratorAccess and FullAccess patterns handled by other detections. This behavior may indicate unauthorized privilege escalation and should be validated against approved administrative changes.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation Persistence
Techniques	T1098.003
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationAdminManagedPolicy.yaml
Version	1.0.2
Arm template	49ce5322-60d7-4b02-ad79-99f650aa5790.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
| where  EventName in ("AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) contains "Admin" and tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) !contains "FullAccess" and tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) !startswith "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, ResponseElements, UserIdentityArn

YAML

entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where  EventName in ("AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) contains "Admin" and tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) !contains "FullAccess" and tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) !startswith "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, ResponseElements, UserIdentityArn
id: 49ce5322-60d7-4b02-ad79-99f650aa5790
queryFrequency: 1d
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: AWS admin managed policy attachment by {{AccountName}}
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} from {{SourceIpAddress}} attaching admin-related managed policy in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
status: Available
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationAdminManagedPolicy.yaml
version: 1.0.2
severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1098.003
name: AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation with admin managed policy
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
description: |
  Detects successful attachment of admin-related managed IAM policies to users, roles, or groups, excluding
  the dedicated AdministratorAccess and FullAccess patterns handled by other detections. This behavior may indicate
  unauthorized privilege escalation and should be validated against approved administrative changes.
customDetails:
  EventSource: EventSource
  EventName: EventName
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1d

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/49ce5322-60d7-4b02-ad79-99f650aa5790')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/49ce5322-60d7-4b02-ad79-99f650aa5790')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected {{EventName}} from {{SourceIpAddress}} attaching admin-related managed policy in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS admin managed policy attachment by {{AccountName}}"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "49ce5322-60d7-4b02-ad79-99f650aa5790",
        "customDetails": {
          "AWSRegion": "AWSRegion",
          "EventName": "EventName",
          "EventSource": "EventSource",
          "UserIdentityArn": "UserIdentityArn"
        },
        "description": "Detects successful attachment of admin-related managed IAM policies to users, roles, or groups, excluding\nthe dedicated AdministratorAccess and FullAccess patterns handled by other detections. This behavior may indicate\nunauthorized privilege escalation and should be validated against approved administrative changes.\n",
        "displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation with admin managed policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationAdminManagedPolicy.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where  EventName in (\"AttachUserPolicy\",\"AttachRolePolicy\",\"AttachGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) contains \"Admin\" and tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) !contains \"FullAccess\" and tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) !startswith \"arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess\"\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, ResponseElements, UserIdentityArn\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1098.003"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence",
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1098"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}