Privilege escalation via DataPipeline policy

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Id	48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23
Rulename	Privilege escalation via DataPipeline policy
Description	Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Datapipeline policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1484
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaDataPipeline.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (((Action has "iam:*" or Action has "iam:PassRole") and Action has "datapipeline:*") or ((Action has "iam:*" or Action has "iam:PassRole") and Action has "datapipeline:CreatePipeline" and Action has "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition" and Action has "datapipeline:ActivatePipeline") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:Create*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Put*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Activate*")) and Resource == "*" and isempty(Condition)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

YAML

severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
kind: Scheduled
id: 48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
queryFrequency: 1d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaDataPipeline.yaml
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
version: 1.0.1
queryPeriod: 1d
name: Privilege escalation via DataPipeline policy
status: Available
description: |
    'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Datapipeline policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
    | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
    | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
    | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
    | mvexpand Statement
    | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
    | extend Action = tostring(Action)
    | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (((Action has "iam:*" or Action has "iam:PassRole") and Action has "datapipeline:*") or ((Action has "iam:*" or Action has "iam:PassRole") and Action has "datapipeline:CreatePipeline" and Action has "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition" and Action has "datapipeline:ActivatePipeline") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:Create*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Put*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Activate*")) and Resource == "*" and isempty(Condition)
    | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
    | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
    | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
    | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
      AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
    | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
    | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Datapipeline policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'\n",
        "displayName": "Privilege escalation via DataPipeline policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaDataPipeline.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n  | where EventName in (\"PutUserPolicy\",\"PutRolePolicy\",\"PutGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)\n  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement\n  | mvexpand Statement\n  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)\n  | extend Action = tostring(Action)\n  | where Effect =~ \"Allow\" and (((Action has \"iam:*\" or Action has \"iam:PassRole\") and Action has \"datapipeline:*\") or ((Action has \"iam:*\" or Action has \"iam:PassRole\") and Action has \"datapipeline:CreatePipeline\" and Action has \"datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition\" and Action has \"datapipeline:ActivatePipeline\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"datapipeline:Create*\" and Action contains \"datapipeline:Put*\" and Action contains \"datapipeline:Activate*\")) and Resource == \"*\" and isempty(Condition)\n  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName\n  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}