AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via DataPipeline policy

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Id	48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23
Rulename	AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via DataPipeline policy
Description	Detects inline IAM policy updates that combine Data Pipeline permissions with IAM privileges such as iam:PassRole. This sequence can enable indirect execution and elevated access pathways, indicating potential privilege escalation activity.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1098.003
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaDataPipeline.yaml
Version	1.0.2
Arm template	48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (((Action has "iam:*" or Action has "iam:PassRole") and Action has "datapipeline:*") or ((Action has "iam:*" or Action has "iam:PassRole") and Action has "datapipeline:CreatePipeline" and Action has "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition" and Action has "datapipeline:ActivatePipeline") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:Create*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Put*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Activate*")) and Resource == "*" and isempty(Condition)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName

YAML

entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: AWS Data Pipeline privilege escalation policy update by {{AccountName}}
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} Event, updating inline Data Pipeline escalation policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
id: 48896551-1c28-4a09-8388-e51e5a927d23
severity: Medium
status: Available
customDetails:
  RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
  EventName: EventName
  PolicyName: PolicyName
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
    | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
    | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
    | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
    | mvexpand Statement
    | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
    | extend Action = tostring(Action)
    | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (((Action has "iam:*" or Action has "iam:PassRole") and Action has "datapipeline:*") or ((Action has "iam:*" or Action has "iam:PassRole") and Action has "datapipeline:CreatePipeline" and Action has "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition" and Action has "datapipeline:ActivatePipeline") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:Create*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Put*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Activate*")) and Resource == "*" and isempty(Condition)
    | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
    | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
    | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
    | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
      AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
    | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName  
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaDataPipeline.yaml
kind: Scheduled
queryPeriod: 1d
version: 1.0.2
name: AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via DataPipeline policy
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerThreshold: 0
relevantTechniques:
- T1098.003
description: |
  Detects inline IAM policy updates that combine Data Pipeline permissions with IAM privileges such as
  iam:PassRole. This sequence can enable indirect execution and elevated access pathways, indicating potential
  privilege escalation activity.  
triggerOperator: gt

ARM