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Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties

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Id48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def
RulenameSuspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
DescriptionThis query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.

Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity
SeverityMedium
TacticsPrivilegeEscalation
TechniquesT1078.004
Required data connectorsAzureActiveDirectory
BehaviorAnalytics
KindScheduled
Query frequency1h
Query period14d
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml
Version1.0.4
Arm template48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def.json
Deploy To Azure
let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_period = 14d;
IdentityInfo
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
| where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
| distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
| join kind=inner (
    AuditLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
    | where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
    // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
    | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
    | where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
    | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
    | where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
    | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
        summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
            bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
                bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
                    "newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
    )
    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
    | extend
        Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
        InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
        IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
) on AccountObjectId
| project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
| extend
    InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
    InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
    AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
    AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])
id: 48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
  connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
- dataTypes:
  - IdentityInfo
  connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
description: |
  'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.
  Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'  
severity: Medium
queryPeriod: 14d
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
queryFrequency: 1h
query: |
  let query_frequency = 1h;
  let query_period = 14d;
  IdentityInfo
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
  | where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
  | distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
  | join kind=inner (
      AuditLogs
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
      | where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
      // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
      | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
      | where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
      | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
      | where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
      | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
          summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
              bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
                  bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
                      "newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
      )
      | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
      | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
      | extend
          Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
          InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
          IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
  ) on AccountObjectId
  | project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
  | extend
      InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
      InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
      AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
      AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])  
version: 1.0.4
triggerThreshold: 0
name: Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Initiator
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: InitiatorName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: InitiatorUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountUPN
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: IPAddress
    identifier: Address
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
metadata:
  support:
    tier: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
    - Identity
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  source:
    kind: Community
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.\nInvestigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'\n",
        "displayName": "Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Initiator",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatorName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatorUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPN",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IPAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml",
        "query": "let query_frequency = 1h;\nlet query_period = 14d;\nIdentityInfo\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)\n| where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, \"Global Administrator\")\n| distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId\n| join kind=inner (\n    AuditLogs\n    | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)\n    | where OperationName=~ \"Update user\" and Result =~ \"success\"\n    // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy[\"user\"])\n    | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources\n    | where TargetResource[\"type\"] == \"User\"\n    | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource[\"id\"])\n    | where tostring(TargetResource[\"modifiedProperties\"]) != \"[]\"\n    | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource[\"modifiedProperties\"] on (\n        summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(\n            bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty[\"displayName\"]),\n                bag_pack(\"oldValue\", trim(@'[\\\"\\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty[\"oldValue\"])),\n                    \"newValue\", trim(@'[\\\"\\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty[\"newValue\"])))))\n    )\n    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties[\"Included Updated Properties\"][\"newValue\"]) in (\"LastDirSyncTime\", \"\"))\n    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties[\"Included Updated Properties\"][\"newValue\"]) == \"StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail\" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties[\"StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail\"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\\\"Id\\\"\\:\\\"([^\\\"]+)\\\"', tostring(modifiedProperties[\"StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail\"][\"newValue\"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\\\"Id\\\"\\:\\\"([^\\\"]+)\\\"', tostring(modifiedProperties[\"StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail\"][\"oldValue\"])))))\n    | extend\n        Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy[\"app\"]), tostring(InitiatedBy[\"app\"][\"displayName\"]), tostring(InitiatedBy[\"user\"][\"userPrincipalName\"])),\n        InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy[\"app\"]), tostring(InitiatedBy[\"app\"][\"servicePrincipalId\"]), tostring(InitiatedBy[\"user\"][\"id\"])),\n        IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])][\"ipAddress\"])\n) on AccountObjectId\n| project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId\n| extend\n    InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, \"@\")[0]),\n    InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, \"@\")[1]),\n    AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, \"@\")[0]),\n    AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, \"@\")[1])\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "P14D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1078.004"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.4",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}