Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties

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Id	48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def
Rulename	Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
Description	This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties. Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1078.004
Required data connectors	AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	14d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def.json

KQL

let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_period = 14d;
IdentityInfo
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
| where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
| distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
| join kind=inner (
    AuditLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
    | where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
    // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
    | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
    | where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
    | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
    | where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
    | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
        summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
            bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
                bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
                    "newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
    )
    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
    | extend
        Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
        InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
        IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
) on AccountObjectId
| project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
| extend
    InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
    InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
    AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
    AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])

YAML

id: 48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Initiator
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatorName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: InitiatorUPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: AccountUPN
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IPAddress
  entityType: IP
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
  connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
- dataTypes:
  - IdentityInfo
  connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
queryFrequency: 1h
metadata:
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
    - Identity
  support:
    tier: Community
  source:
    kind: Community
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerThreshold: 0
query: |
  let query_frequency = 1h;
  let query_period = 14d;
  IdentityInfo
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
  | where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
  | distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
  | join kind=inner (
      AuditLogs
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
      | where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
      // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
      | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
      | where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
      | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
      | where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
      | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
          summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
              bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
                  bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
                      "newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
      )
      | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
      | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
      | extend
          Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
          InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
          IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
  ) on AccountObjectId
  | project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
  | extend
      InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
      InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
      AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
      AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])  
name: Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
version: 1.0.4
description: |
  'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.
  Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'

ARM