Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties

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Id	48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def
Rulename	Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
Description	This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties. Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1078.004
Required data connectors	AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	14d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def.json

KQL

let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_period = 14d;
IdentityInfo
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
| where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
| distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
| join kind=inner (
    AuditLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
    | where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
    // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
    | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
    | where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
    | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
    | where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
    | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
        summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
            bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
                bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
                    "newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
    )
    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
    | extend
        Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
        InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
        IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
) on AccountObjectId
| project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
| extend
    InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
    InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
    AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
    AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])

YAML

queryFrequency: 1h
version: 1.0.4
queryPeriod: 14d
id: 48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
query: |
  let query_frequency = 1h;
  let query_period = 14d;
  IdentityInfo
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
  | where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
  | distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
  | join kind=inner (
      AuditLogs
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
      | where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
      // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
      | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
      | where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
      | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
      | where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
      | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
          summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
              bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
                  bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
                      "newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
      )
      | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
      | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
      | extend
          Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
          InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
          IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
  ) on AccountObjectId
  | project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
  | extend
      InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
      InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
      AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
      AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])  
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
  dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
- connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
  dataTypes:
  - IdentityInfo
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Initiator
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatorName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: InitiatorUPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: AccountUPN
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IPAddress
metadata:
  support:
    tier: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
    - Identity
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  source:
    kind: Community
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml
name: Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
description: |
  'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.
  Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'  
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004

ARM