Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties

let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_period = 14d;
IdentityInfo
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
| where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
| distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
| join kind=inner (
    AuditLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
    | where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
    // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
    | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
    | where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
    | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
    | where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
    | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
        summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
            bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
                bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
                    "newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
    )
    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
    | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
    | extend
        Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
        InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
        IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
) on AccountObjectId
| project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
| extend
    InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
    InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
    AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
    AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])

triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Initiator
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatorName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: InitiatorUPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: AccountUPN
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IPAddress
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
  connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
- dataTypes:
  - IdentityInfo
  connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml
name: Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
query: |
  let query_frequency = 1h;
  let query_period = 14d;
  IdentityInfo
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
  | where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
  | distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
  | join kind=inner (
      AuditLogs
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
      | where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
      // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
      | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
      | where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
      | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
      | where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
      | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
          summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
              bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
                  bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
                      "newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
      )
      | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
      | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
      | extend
          Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
          InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
          IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
  ) on AccountObjectId
  | project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
  | extend
      InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
      InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
      AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
      AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])  
version: 1.0.4
queryPeriod: 14d
kind: Scheduled
id: 48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def
description: |
  'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.
  Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'  
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: Medium
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
metadata:
  source:
    kind: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
    - Identity
  support:
    tier: Community
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research