Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
| Id | 48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def |
| Rulename | Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties |
| Description | This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties. Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | PrivilegeEscalation |
| Techniques | T1078.004 |
| Required data connectors | AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1h |
| Query period | 14d |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.4 |
| Arm template | 48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def.json |
let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_period = 14d;
IdentityInfo
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
| where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
| distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
| join kind=inner (
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
| where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
// | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
| mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
| where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
| extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
| where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
| mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
"newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
)
| where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
| where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
| extend
Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
) on AccountObjectId
| project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
| extend
InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml
query: |
let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_period = 14d;
IdentityInfo
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
| where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, "Global Administrator")
| distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId
| join kind=inner (
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
| where OperationName=~ "Update user" and Result =~ "success"
// | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy["user"])
| mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
| where TargetResource["type"] == "User"
| extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource["id"])
| where tostring(TargetResource["modifiedProperties"]) != "[]"
| mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource["modifiedProperties"] on (
summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(
bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty["displayName"]),
bag_pack("oldValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["oldValue"])),
"newValue", trim(@'[\"\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty["newValue"])))))
)
| where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) in ("LastDirSyncTime", ""))
| where not(tostring(modifiedProperties["Included Updated Properties"]["newValue"]) == "StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["newValue"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\"Id\"\:\"([^\"]+)\"', tostring(modifiedProperties["StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail"]["oldValue"])))))
| extend
Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
) on AccountObjectId
| project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
| extend
InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[0]),
InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, "@")[1]),
AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[0]),
AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, "@")[1])
description: |
'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.
Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AuditLogs
connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
- dataTypes:
- IdentityInfo
connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
name: Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties
triggerThreshold: 0
metadata:
source:
kind: Community
categories:
domains:
- Security - Others
- Identity
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
support:
tier: Community
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
version: 1.0.4
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
triggerOperator: gt
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: Initiator
identifier: FullName
- columnName: InitiatorName
identifier: Name
- columnName: InitiatorUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: AccountUPN
identifier: FullName
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: IPAddress
identifier: Address
id: 48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 14d
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "48602a24-67cf-4362-b258-3f4249e55def",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.\nInvestigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'\n",
"displayName": "Suspicious modification of Global Administrator user properties",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Initiator",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatorName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatorUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountUPN",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SuspiciousModificationofGlobalAdminProperties.yaml",
"query": "let query_frequency = 1h;\nlet query_period = 14d;\nIdentityInfo\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)\n| where set_has_element(AssignedRoles, \"Global Administrator\")\n| distinct AccountUPN, AccountObjectId\n| join kind=inner (\n AuditLogs\n | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)\n | where OperationName=~ \"Update user\" and Result =~ \"success\"\n // | where isnotempty(InitiatedBy[\"user\"])\n | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources\n | where TargetResource[\"type\"] == \"User\"\n | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(TargetResource[\"id\"])\n | where tostring(TargetResource[\"modifiedProperties\"]) != \"[]\"\n | mv-apply modifiedProperty = TargetResource[\"modifiedProperties\"] on (\n summarize modifiedProperties = make_bag(\n bag_pack(tostring(modifiedProperty[\"displayName\"]),\n bag_pack(\"oldValue\", trim(@'[\\\"\\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty[\"oldValue\"])),\n \"newValue\", trim(@'[\\\"\\s]+', tostring(modifiedProperty[\"newValue\"])))))\n )\n | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties[\"Included Updated Properties\"][\"newValue\"]) in (\"LastDirSyncTime\", \"\"))\n | where not(tostring(modifiedProperties[\"Included Updated Properties\"][\"newValue\"]) == \"StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail\" and isnotempty(modifiedProperties[\"StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail\"]) and tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\\\"Id\\\"\\:\\\"([^\\\"]+)\\\"', tostring(modifiedProperties[\"StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail\"][\"newValue\"])))) == tostring(array_sort_asc(extract_all(@'\\\"Id\\\"\\:\\\"([^\\\"]+)\\\"', tostring(modifiedProperties[\"StrongAuthenticationPhoneAppDetail\"][\"oldValue\"])))))\n | extend\n Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy[\"app\"]), tostring(InitiatedBy[\"app\"][\"displayName\"]), tostring(InitiatedBy[\"user\"][\"userPrincipalName\"])),\n InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy[\"app\"]), tostring(InitiatedBy[\"app\"][\"servicePrincipalId\"]), tostring(InitiatedBy[\"user\"][\"id\"])),\n IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])][\"ipAddress\"])\n) on AccountObjectId\n| project TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, IPAddress, OperationName, Result, AccountUPN, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, AccountObjectId, InitiatorId, CorrelationId\n| extend\n InitiatorName = tostring(split(Initiator, \"@\")[0]),\n InitiatorUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiator, \"@\")[1]),\n AccountName = tostring(split(AccountUPN, \"@\")[0]),\n AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AccountUPN, \"@\")[1])\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "P14D",
"severity": "Medium",
"subTechniques": [
"T1078.004"
],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"PrivilegeEscalation"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.4",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}