Dev-0270 Malicious Powershell usage

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Id	422ca2bf-598b-4872-82bb-5f7e8fa731e7
Rulename	Dev-0270 Malicious Powershell usage
Description	DEV-0270 heavily uses powershell to achieve their objective at various stages of their attack. To locate powershell related activity tied to the actor, Microsoft Sentinel customers can run the following query.
Severity	High
Tactics	Exfiltration DefenseEvasion
Techniques	T1048 T1562
Required data connectors	MicrosoftThreatProtection SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	6h
Query period	6h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Dev 0270 Detection and Hunting/Analytic Rules/Dev-0270PowershellSep2022.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	422ca2bf-598b-4872-82bb-5f7e8fa731e7.json

KQL

(union isfuzzy=true
(SecurityEvent
| where EventID==4688
| extend FileName=tostring(split(NewProcessName, @'\')[(-1)]),  ProcessCommandLine = CommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName=ParentProcessName
| where (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all("try", "Add-MpPreference", "-ExclusionPath", "ProgramData", "catch")) or (FileName =~ 'powershell.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders') )
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, InitiatingProcessFileName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type
),
(DeviceProcessEvents 
| where (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ((ProcessCommandLine has_all("try", "Add-MpPreference", "-ExclusionPath", "ProgramData", "catch"))  or (ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders'))))
or ( InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powershell.exe' and (((InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$file=', 'dllhost.exe', 'Invoke-WebRequest', '-OutFile')) or ((InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$admins=', 'System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier', 'Translate', '-split', 'localgroup', '/add', '$rdp='))))))
| extend Account = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, @'\', InitiatingProcessAccountName),  Computer = DeviceName
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])

YAML

description: |
    'DEV-0270 heavily uses powershell to achieve their objective at various stages of their attack. To locate powershell related activity tied to the actor, Microsoft Sentinel customers can run the following query.'
status: Available
queryPeriod: 6h
triggerThreshold: 0
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Dev 0270 Detection and Hunting/Analytic Rules/Dev-0270PowershellSep2022.yaml
id: 422ca2bf-598b-4872-82bb-5f7e8fa731e7
kind: Scheduled
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
- connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
tactics:
- Exfiltration
- DefenseEvasion
severity: High
triggerOperator: gt
tags:
- Dev-0270
version: 1.0.4
query: |
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (SecurityEvent
  | where EventID==4688
  | extend FileName=tostring(split(NewProcessName, @'\')[(-1)]),  ProcessCommandLine = CommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName=ParentProcessName
  | where (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all("try", "Add-MpPreference", "-ExclusionPath", "ProgramData", "catch")) or (FileName =~ 'powershell.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders') )
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, InitiatingProcessFileName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type
  ),
  (DeviceProcessEvents 
  | where (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ((ProcessCommandLine has_all("try", "Add-MpPreference", "-ExclusionPath", "ProgramData", "catch"))  or (ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders'))))
  or ( InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powershell.exe' and (((InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$file=', 'dllhost.exe', 'Invoke-WebRequest', '-OutFile')) or ((InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$admins=', 'System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier', 'Translate', '-split', 'localgroup', '/add', '$rdp='))))))
  | extend Account = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, @'\', InitiatingProcessAccountName),  Computer = DeviceName
  )
  )
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])  
name: Dev-0270 Malicious Powershell usage
queryFrequency: 6h
relevantTechniques:
- T1048
- T1562
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Account
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountNTDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Computer
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/422ca2bf-598b-4872-82bb-5f7e8fa731e7')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/422ca2bf-598b-4872-82bb-5f7e8fa731e7')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "422ca2bf-598b-4872-82bb-5f7e8fa731e7",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'DEV-0270 heavily uses powershell to achieve their objective at various stages of their attack. To locate powershell related activity tied to the actor, Microsoft Sentinel customers can run the following query.'\n",
        "displayName": "Dev-0270 Malicious Powershell usage",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Account",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountNTDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Dev 0270 Detection and Hunting/Analytic Rules/Dev-0270PowershellSep2022.yaml",
        "query": "(union isfuzzy=true\n(SecurityEvent\n| where EventID==4688\n| extend FileName=tostring(split(NewProcessName, @'\\')[(-1)]),  ProcessCommandLine = CommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName=ParentProcessName\n| where (FileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine has_all(\"try\", \"Add-MpPreference\", \"-ExclusionPath\", \"ProgramData\", \"catch\")) or (FileName =~ 'powershell.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders') )\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, InitiatingProcessFileName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type\n),\n(DeviceProcessEvents \n| where (FileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" and ((ProcessCommandLine has_all(\"try\", \"Add-MpPreference\", \"-ExclusionPath\", \"ProgramData\", \"catch\"))  or (ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders'))))\nor ( InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powershell.exe' and (((InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$file=', 'dllhost.exe', 'Invoke-WebRequest', '-OutFile')) or ((InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$admins=', 'System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier', 'Translate', '-split', 'localgroup', '/add', '$rdp='))))))\n| extend Account = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, @'\\', InitiatingProcessAccountName),  Computer = DeviceName\n)\n)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\\')[0])\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT6H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT6H",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion",
          "Exfiltration"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "Dev-0270"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1048",
          "T1562"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.4",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}