Dev-0228 File Path Hashes November 2021

let files1 = dynamic(["C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\lsa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pc.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\Rar.exe"]);
let files2 = dynamic(["svchost.exe","wdmsvc.exe"]);
let FileHash1 = dynamic(["43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3", "ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb", "010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77",         "56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7"]);
let FileHash2 = dynamic(["2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7", "9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd", "18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ( FolderPath has_any (files1) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash1)) or (FolderPath has_any (files2) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash2))
| extend DvcId = DeviceId
| join kind=leftouter (SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName =~ "MDATP"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| mv-expand todynamic(Entities)
| extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)
| where isnotempty(DvcId)
// Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor
| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any ("Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A", "Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll", "Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB"), 1.0, 0.5)
| project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) on DvcId
| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, "\\", InitiatingProcessAccountName)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

name: Dev-0228 File Path Hashes November 2021
id: 3b443f22-9be9-4c35-ac70-a94757748439
triggerThreshold: 0
severity: High
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
- Execution
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0228FilePathHashesNovember2021.yaml
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccount
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: File
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: FileName
    identifier: Name
queryPeriod: 6h
queryFrequency: 6h
version: 1.1.2
triggerOperator: gt
description: |
  'This hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity.
   The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.'  
metadata:
  support:
    tier: Community
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  source:
    kind: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - 0-day Vulnerability
query: |
  let files1 = dynamic(["C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\lsa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pc.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\Rar.exe"]);
  let files2 = dynamic(["svchost.exe","wdmsvc.exe"]);
  let FileHash1 = dynamic(["43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3", "ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb", "010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77",         "56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7"]);
  let FileHash2 = dynamic(["2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7", "9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd", "18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b"]);
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where ( FolderPath has_any (files1) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash1)) or (FolderPath has_any (files2) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash2))
  | extend DvcId = DeviceId
  | join kind=leftouter (SecurityAlert
  | where ProviderName =~ "MDATP"
  | extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
  | mv-expand todynamic(Entities)
  | extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)
  | where isnotempty(DvcId)
  // Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor
  | extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any ("Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A", "Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll", "Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB"), 1.0, 0.5)
  | project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) on DvcId
  | extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, "\\", InitiatingProcessAccountName)
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
relevantTechniques:
- T1569
- T1003
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityAlert (MDATP)
  connectorId: MicrosoftDefenderAdvancedThreatProtection
- dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
  connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
kind: Scheduled

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/3b443f22-9be9-4c35-ac70-a94757748439')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/3b443f22-9be9-4c35-ac70-a94757748439')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "3b443f22-9be9-4c35-ac70-a94757748439",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity.\n The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.'\n",
        "displayName": "Dev-0228 File Path Hashes November 2021",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccount",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccountDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "File",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "FileName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0228FilePathHashesNovember2021.yaml",
        "query": "let files1 = dynamic([\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\lsa.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\pa.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\pc.exe\", \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TAPI\\\\Rar.exe\"]);\nlet files2 = dynamic([\"svchost.exe\",\"wdmsvc.exe\"]);\nlet FileHash1 = dynamic([\"43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3\", \"ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb\", \"010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77\",         \"56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7\"]);\nlet FileHash2 = dynamic([\"2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7\", \"9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd\", \"18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b\"]);\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where ( FolderPath has_any (files1) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash1)) or (FolderPath has_any (files2) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash2))\n| extend DvcId = DeviceId\n| join kind=leftouter (SecurityAlert\n| where ProviderName =~ \"MDATP\"\n| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)\n| mv-expand todynamic(Entities)\n| extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)\n| where isnotempty(DvcId)\n// Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor\n| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any (\"Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A\", \"Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll\", \"Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB\"), 1.0, 0.5)\n| project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) on DvcId\n| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)\n| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, \"\\\\\", InitiatingProcessAccountName)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT6H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT6H",
        "severity": "High",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CredentialAccess",
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1003",
          "T1569"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.1.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}