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Dev-0228 File Path Hashes November 2021

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Id3b443f22-9be9-4c35-ac70-a94757748439
RulenameDev-0228 File Path Hashes November 2021
DescriptionThis hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity.

The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.
SeverityHigh
TacticsCredentialAccess
Execution
TechniquesT1569
T1003
Required data connectorsMicrosoftDefenderAdvancedThreatProtection
MicrosoftThreatProtection
KindScheduled
Query frequency6h
Query period6h
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0228FilePathHashesNovember2021.yaml
Version1.1.2
Arm template3b443f22-9be9-4c35-ac70-a94757748439.json
Deploy To Azure
let files1 = dynamic(["C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\lsa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pc.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\Rar.exe"]);
let files2 = dynamic(["svchost.exe","wdmsvc.exe"]);
let FileHash1 = dynamic(["43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3", "ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb", "010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77",         "56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7"]);
let FileHash2 = dynamic(["2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7", "9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd", "18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ( FolderPath has_any (files1) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash1)) or (FolderPath has_any (files2) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash2))
| extend DvcId = DeviceId
| join kind=leftouter (SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName =~ "MDATP"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| mv-expand todynamic(Entities)
| extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)
| where isnotempty(DvcId)
// Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor
| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any ("Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A", "Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll", "Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB"), 1.0, 0.5)
| project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) on DvcId
| extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, "\\", InitiatingProcessAccountName)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
queryFrequency: 6h
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftDefenderAdvancedThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityAlert (MDATP)
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0228FilePathHashesNovember2021.yaml
name: Dev-0228 File Path Hashes November 2021
description: |
  'This hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity.
   The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.'  
severity: High
metadata:
  support:
    tier: Community
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - 0-day Vulnerability
  source:
    kind: Community
kind: Scheduled
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 1.1.2
relevantTechniques:
- T1569
- T1003
id: 3b443f22-9be9-4c35-ac70-a94757748439
triggerOperator: gt
queryPeriod: 6h
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
- Execution
query: |
  let files1 = dynamic(["C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\lsa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pa.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\pc.exe", "C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\Rar.exe"]);
  let files2 = dynamic(["svchost.exe","wdmsvc.exe"]);
  let FileHash1 = dynamic(["43109fbe8b752f7a9076eaafa417d9ae5c6e827cd5374b866672263fdebd5ec3", "ab50d8d707b97712178a92bbac74ccc2a5699eb41c17aa77f713ff3e568dcedb", "010e32be0f86545e116a8bc3381a8428933eb8789f32c261c81fd5e7857d4a77",         "56cd102b9fc7f3523dad01d632525ff673259dbc9a091be0feff333c931574f7"]);
  let FileHash2 = dynamic(["2a1044e9e6e87a032f80c6d9ea6ae61bbbb053c0a21b186ecb3b812b49eb03b7", "9ab7e99ed84f94a7b6409b87e56dc6e1143b05034a5e4455e8c555dbbcd0d2dd", "18a072ccfab239e140d8f682e2874e8ff19d94311fc8bb9564043d3e0deda54b"]);
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where ( FolderPath has_any (files1) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash1)) or (FolderPath has_any (files2) and SHA256 has_any (FileHash2))
  | extend DvcId = DeviceId
  | join kind=leftouter (SecurityAlert
  | where ProviderName =~ "MDATP"
  | extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
  | mv-expand todynamic(Entities)
  | extend DvcId = tostring(parse_json(Entities).MdatpDeviceId)
  | where isnotempty(DvcId)
  // Higher risk score are for Defender alerts related to threat actor
  | extend AlertRiskScore = iif(ThreatName has_any ("Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A", "Backdoor:MSIL/ShellClient.A!dll", "Trojan:MSIL/Mimikatz.BA!MTB"), 1.0, 0.5)
  | project DvcId, AlertRiskScore) on DvcId
  | extend AlertRiskScore = iif(isempty(AlertRiskScore), 0.0, AlertRiskScore)
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, "\\", InitiatingProcessAccountName)
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: DeviceName
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: HostNameDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccount
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: FileName
  entityType: File