Suspicious application consent similar to PwnAuth

let detectionTime = 1d;
let joinLookback = 14d;
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(detectionTime)
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
| where OperationName =~ "Consent to application"
| where TargetResources has "offline"
| mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
  (
      where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
      | extend AppDisplayName = tostring(TargetResource.displayName),
               AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id),
               props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties
  )
| where AppClientId !in ((externaldata(knownAppClientId:string, knownAppDisplayName:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Microsoft.OAuth.KnownApplications.csv"] with (format="csv")))
| mv-apply ConsentFull = props on 
  (
      where ConsentFull.displayName =~ "ConsentAction.Permissions"
  )
| parse ConsentFull with * "ConsentType: " GrantConsentType ", Scope: " GrantScope1 "]" *
| where ConsentFull has_all ("user.read", "offline_access", "mail.readwrite", "mail.send", "files.read.all")
| where GrantConsentType != "AllPrincipals" // NOTE: we are ignoring if OAuth application was granted to all users via an admin - but admin due diligence should be audited occasionally
| extend GrantInitiatedByAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend GrantInitiatedByAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend GrantIpAddress = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
| extend GrantInitiatedBy = iff(isnotempty(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName), GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAppName)
| mv-apply AdditionalDetail = AdditionalDetails on 
  (
      where AdditionalDetail.key =~ "User-Agent"
      | extend GrantUserAgent = AdditionalDetail.value
  )
| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAadUserId, GrantInitiatedByAppName, GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, OperationName, ConsentFull, CorrelationId
| join kind = leftouter (AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
| where OperationName =~ "Add service principal"
  | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
      (
          where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
          | extend props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties,
                  AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id)
      )
  | mv-apply Property = props on 
      (
          where Property.displayName =~ "AppAddress" and Property.newValue has "AddressType"
          | extend AppReplyURLs = trim('"',tostring(Property.newValue))
      )
| distinct AppClientId, tostring(AppReplyURLs)
)
on AppClientId
| join kind = innerunique (AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
| where OperationName =~ "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant" or OperationName =~ "Add delegated permission grant"
      | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
          (
              where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal" and array_length(TargetResource.modifiedProperties) > 0 and isnotnull(TargetResource.displayName)
              | extend GrantAuthentication = tostring(TargetResource.displayName)
          )
| extend GrantOperation = OperationName
| project GrantAuthentication, GrantOperation, CorrelationId
) on CorrelationId
| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, AppReplyURLs, GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAadUserId, GrantInitiatedByAppName, GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, GrantAuthentication, OperationName, GrantOperation, CorrelationId, ConsentFull
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Name = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName,'@',0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName,'@',1)[0])

relevantTechniques:
- T1528
- T1550
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 1.0.2
triggerOperator: gt
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
  connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
name: Suspicious application consent similar to PwnAuth
query: |
  let detectionTime = 1d;
  let joinLookback = 14d;
  AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(detectionTime)
  | where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
  | where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
  | where OperationName =~ "Consent to application"
  | where TargetResources has "offline"
  | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
    (
        where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
        | extend AppDisplayName = tostring(TargetResource.displayName),
                 AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id),
                 props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties
    )
  | where AppClientId !in ((externaldata(knownAppClientId:string, knownAppDisplayName:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Microsoft.OAuth.KnownApplications.csv"] with (format="csv")))
  | mv-apply ConsentFull = props on 
    (
        where ConsentFull.displayName =~ "ConsentAction.Permissions"
    )
  | parse ConsentFull with * "ConsentType: " GrantConsentType ", Scope: " GrantScope1 "]" *
  | where ConsentFull has_all ("user.read", "offline_access", "mail.readwrite", "mail.send", "files.read.all")
  | where GrantConsentType != "AllPrincipals" // NOTE: we are ignoring if OAuth application was granted to all users via an admin - but admin due diligence should be audited occasionally
  | extend GrantInitiatedByAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
  | extend GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
  | extend GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend GrantInitiatedByAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
  | extend GrantIpAddress = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
  | extend GrantInitiatedBy = iff(isnotempty(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName), GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAppName)
  | mv-apply AdditionalDetail = AdditionalDetails on 
    (
        where AdditionalDetail.key =~ "User-Agent"
        | extend GrantUserAgent = AdditionalDetail.value
    )
  | project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAadUserId, GrantInitiatedByAppName, GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, OperationName, ConsentFull, CorrelationId
  | join kind = leftouter (AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
  | where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
  | where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
  | where OperationName =~ "Add service principal"
    | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
        (
            where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
            | extend props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties,
                    AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id)
        )
    | mv-apply Property = props on 
        (
            where Property.displayName =~ "AppAddress" and Property.newValue has "AddressType"
            | extend AppReplyURLs = trim('"',tostring(Property.newValue))
        )
  | distinct AppClientId, tostring(AppReplyURLs)
  )
  on AppClientId
  | join kind = innerunique (AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
  | where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
  | where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
  | where OperationName =~ "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant" or OperationName =~ "Add delegated permission grant"
        | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
            (
                where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal" and array_length(TargetResource.modifiedProperties) > 0 and isnotnull(TargetResource.displayName)
                | extend GrantAuthentication = tostring(TargetResource.displayName)
            )
  | extend GrantOperation = OperationName
  | project GrantAuthentication, GrantOperation, CorrelationId
  ) on CorrelationId
  | project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, AppReplyURLs, GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAadUserId, GrantInitiatedByAppName, GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, GrantAuthentication, OperationName, GrantOperation, CorrelationId, ConsentFull
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Name = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName,'@',0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName,'@',1)[0])  
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
status: Available
description: |
  'This will alert when a user consents to provide a previously-unknown Azure application with the same OAuth permissions used by the FireEye PwnAuth toolkit (https://github.com/fireeye/PwnAuth).
  The default permissions/scope for the PwnAuth toolkit are user.read, offline_access, mail.readwrite, mail.send, and files.read.all.
  Consent to applications with these permissions should be rare, especially as the knownApplications list is expanded. Public contributions to expand this filter are welcome!
  For further information on AuditLogs please see https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities.'  
queryFrequency: 1d
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
- DefenseEvasion
queryPeriod: 14d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Microsoft Entra ID/Analytic Rules/MaliciousOAuthApp_PwnAuth.yaml
id: 39198934-62a0-4781-8416-a81265c03fd6
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: Name
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: AadUserId
    columnName: GrantInitiatedByAadUserId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: AadUserId
    columnName: GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: GrantIpAddress
  entityType: IP

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/39198934-62a0-4781-8416-a81265c03fd6')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/39198934-62a0-4781-8416-a81265c03fd6')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "39198934-62a0-4781-8416-a81265c03fd6",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This will alert when a user consents to provide a previously-unknown Azure application with the same OAuth permissions used by the FireEye PwnAuth toolkit (https://github.com/fireeye/PwnAuth).\nThe default permissions/scope for the PwnAuth toolkit are user.read, offline_access, mail.readwrite, mail.send, and files.read.all.\nConsent to applications with these permissions should be rare, especially as the knownApplications list is expanded. Public contributions to expand this filter are welcome!\nFor further information on AuditLogs please see https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities.'\n",
        "displayName": "Suspicious application consent similar to PwnAuth",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "Name",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "UPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "GrantInitiatedByAadUserId",
                "identifier": "AadUserId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId",
                "identifier": "AadUserId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "GrantIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Microsoft Entra ID/Analytic Rules/MaliciousOAuthApp_PwnAuth.yaml",
        "query": "let detectionTime = 1d;\nlet joinLookback = 14d;\nAuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(detectionTime)\n| where LoggedByService =~ \"Core Directory\"\n| where Category =~ \"ApplicationManagement\"\n| where OperationName =~ \"Consent to application\"\n| where TargetResources has \"offline\"\n| mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on \n  (\n      where TargetResource.type =~ \"ServicePrincipal\"\n      | extend AppDisplayName = tostring(TargetResource.displayName),\n               AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id),\n               props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties\n  )\n| where AppClientId !in ((externaldata(knownAppClientId:string, knownAppDisplayName:string)[@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Microsoft.OAuth.KnownApplications.csv\"] with (format=\"csv\")))\n| mv-apply ConsentFull = props on \n  (\n      where ConsentFull.displayName =~ \"ConsentAction.Permissions\"\n  )\n| parse ConsentFull with * \"ConsentType: \" GrantConsentType \", Scope: \" GrantScope1 \"]\" *\n| where ConsentFull has_all (\"user.read\", \"offline_access\", \"mail.readwrite\", \"mail.send\", \"files.read.all\")\n| where GrantConsentType != \"AllPrincipals\" // NOTE: we are ignoring if OAuth application was granted to all users via an admin - but admin due diligence should be audited occasionally\n| extend GrantInitiatedByAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)\n| extend GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)\n| extend GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| extend GrantInitiatedByAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)\n| extend GrantIpAddress = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))\n| extend GrantInitiatedBy = iff(isnotempty(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName), GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAppName)\n| mv-apply AdditionalDetail = AdditionalDetails on \n  (\n      where AdditionalDetail.key =~ \"User-Agent\"\n      | extend GrantUserAgent = AdditionalDetail.value\n  )\n| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAadUserId, GrantInitiatedByAppName, GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, OperationName, ConsentFull, CorrelationId\n| join kind = leftouter (AuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)\n| where LoggedByService =~ \"Core Directory\"\n| where Category =~ \"ApplicationManagement\"\n| where OperationName =~ \"Add service principal\"\n  | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on \n      (\n          where TargetResource.type =~ \"ServicePrincipal\"\n          | extend props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties,\n                  AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id)\n      )\n  | mv-apply Property = props on \n      (\n          where Property.displayName =~ \"AppAddress\" and Property.newValue has \"AddressType\"\n          | extend AppReplyURLs = trim('\"',tostring(Property.newValue))\n      )\n| distinct AppClientId, tostring(AppReplyURLs)\n)\non AppClientId\n| join kind = innerunique (AuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)\n| where LoggedByService =~ \"Core Directory\"\n| where Category =~ \"ApplicationManagement\"\n| where OperationName =~ \"Add OAuth2PermissionGrant\" or OperationName =~ \"Add delegated permission grant\"\n      | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on \n          (\n              where TargetResource.type =~ \"ServicePrincipal\" and array_length(TargetResource.modifiedProperties) > 0 and isnotnull(TargetResource.displayName)\n              | extend GrantAuthentication = tostring(TargetResource.displayName)\n          )\n| extend GrantOperation = OperationName\n| project GrantAuthentication, GrantOperation, CorrelationId\n) on CorrelationId\n| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, AppReplyURLs, GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName, GrantInitiatedByAadUserId, GrantInitiatedByAppName, GrantInitiatedByAppServicePrincipalId, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, GrantAuthentication, OperationName, GrantOperation, CorrelationId, ConsentFull\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Name = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName,'@',0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedByUserPrincipalName,'@',1)[0])\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P14D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CredentialAccess",
          "DefenseEvasion"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1528",
          "T1550"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}