Suspicious application consent similar to PwnAuth

let detectionTime = 1d;
let joinLookback = 14d;
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(detectionTime)
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
| where OperationName =~ "Consent to application"
| where TargetResources has "offline"
| mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
  (
      where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
      | extend AppDisplayName = tostring(TargetResource.displayName),
               AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id),
               props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties
  )
| where AppClientId !in ((externaldata(knownAppClientId:string, knownAppDisplayName:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Microsoft.OAuth.KnownApplications.csv"] with (format="csv")))
| mv-apply ConsentFull = props on 
  (
      where ConsentFull.displayName =~ "ConsentAction.Permissions"
  )
| parse ConsentFull with * "ConsentType: " GrantConsentType ", Scope: " GrantScope1 "]" *
| where ConsentFull has_all ("user.read", "offline_access", "mail.readwrite", "mail.send", "files.read.all")
| where GrantConsentType != "AllPrincipals" // NOTE: we are ignoring if OAuth application was granted to all users via an admin - but admin due diligence should be audited occasionally
| extend GrantIpAddress = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
| extend GrantInitiatedBy = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName))
| mv-apply AdditionalDetail = AdditionalDetails on 
  (
      where AdditionalDetail.key =~ "User-Agent"
      | extend GrantUserAgent = AdditionalDetail.value
  )
| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, OperationName, ConsentFull, CorrelationId
| join kind = leftouter (AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
| where OperationName =~ "Add service principal"
  | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
      (
          where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
          | extend props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties,
                  AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id)
      )
  | mv-apply Property = props on 
      (
          where Property.displayName =~ "AppAddress" and Property.newValue has "AddressType"
          | extend AppReplyURLs = trim('"',tostring(Property.newValue))
      )
| distinct AppClientId, tostring(AppReplyURLs)
)
on AppClientId
| join kind = innerunique (AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
| where OperationName =~ "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant" or OperationName =~ "Add delegated permission grant"
      | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
          (
              where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal" and array_length(TargetResource.modifiedProperties) > 0 and isnotnull(TargetResource.displayName)
              | extend GrantAuthentication = tostring(TargetResource.displayName)
          )
| extend GrantOperation = OperationName
| project GrantAuthentication, GrantOperation, CorrelationId
) on CorrelationId
| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, AppReplyURLs, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, GrantAuthentication, OperationName, GrantOperation, CorrelationId, ConsentFull
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Name = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedBy,'@',0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedBy,'@',1)[0])

kind: Scheduled
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Azure Active Directory/Analytic Rules/MaliciousOAuthApp_PwnAuth.yaml
severity: Medium
name: Suspicious application consent similar to PwnAuth
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Name
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: UPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: GrantIpAddress
    identifier: Address
relevantTechniques:
- T1528
- T1550
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 14d
description: |
  'This will alert when a user consents to provide a previously-unknown Azure application with the same OAuth permissions used by the FireEye PwnAuth toolkit (https://github.com/fireeye/PwnAuth).
  The default permissions/scope for the PwnAuth toolkit are user.read, offline_access, mail.readwrite, mail.send, and files.read.all.
  Consent to applications with these permissions should be rare, especially as the knownApplications list is expanded. Public contributions to expand this filter are welcome!
  For further information on AuditLogs please see https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities.'  
id: 39198934-62a0-4781-8416-a81265c03fd6
version: 1.0.1
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
- DefenseEvasion
query: |
  let detectionTime = 1d;
  let joinLookback = 14d;
  AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(detectionTime)
  | where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
  | where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
  | where OperationName =~ "Consent to application"
  | where TargetResources has "offline"
  | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
    (
        where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
        | extend AppDisplayName = tostring(TargetResource.displayName),
                 AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id),
                 props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties
    )
  | where AppClientId !in ((externaldata(knownAppClientId:string, knownAppDisplayName:string)[@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Microsoft.OAuth.KnownApplications.csv"] with (format="csv")))
  | mv-apply ConsentFull = props on 
    (
        where ConsentFull.displayName =~ "ConsentAction.Permissions"
    )
  | parse ConsentFull with * "ConsentType: " GrantConsentType ", Scope: " GrantScope1 "]" *
  | where ConsentFull has_all ("user.read", "offline_access", "mail.readwrite", "mail.send", "files.read.all")
  | where GrantConsentType != "AllPrincipals" // NOTE: we are ignoring if OAuth application was granted to all users via an admin - but admin due diligence should be audited occasionally
  | extend GrantIpAddress = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
  | extend GrantInitiatedBy = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName))
  | mv-apply AdditionalDetail = AdditionalDetails on 
    (
        where AdditionalDetail.key =~ "User-Agent"
        | extend GrantUserAgent = AdditionalDetail.value
    )
  | project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, OperationName, ConsentFull, CorrelationId
  | join kind = leftouter (AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
  | where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
  | where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
  | where OperationName =~ "Add service principal"
    | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
        (
            where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal"
            | extend props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties,
                    AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id)
        )
    | mv-apply Property = props on 
        (
            where Property.displayName =~ "AppAddress" and Property.newValue has "AddressType"
            | extend AppReplyURLs = trim('"',tostring(Property.newValue))
        )
  | distinct AppClientId, tostring(AppReplyURLs)
  )
  on AppClientId
  | join kind = innerunique (AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)
  | where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
  | where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
  | where OperationName =~ "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant" or OperationName =~ "Add delegated permission grant"
        | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on 
            (
                where TargetResource.type =~ "ServicePrincipal" and array_length(TargetResource.modifiedProperties) > 0 and isnotnull(TargetResource.displayName)
                | extend GrantAuthentication = tostring(TargetResource.displayName)
            )
  | extend GrantOperation = OperationName
  | project GrantAuthentication, GrantOperation, CorrelationId
  ) on CorrelationId
  | project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, AppReplyURLs, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, GrantAuthentication, OperationName, GrantOperation, CorrelationId, ConsentFull
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Name = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedBy,'@',0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedBy,'@',1)[0])  
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
  connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
triggerOperator: gt

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/39198934-62a0-4781-8416-a81265c03fd6')]",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/39198934-62a0-4781-8416-a81265c03fd6')]",
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "apiVersion": "2022-11-01-preview",
      "properties": {
        "displayName": "Suspicious application consent similar to PwnAuth",
        "description": "'This will alert when a user consents to provide a previously-unknown Azure application with the same OAuth permissions used by the FireEye PwnAuth toolkit (https://github.com/fireeye/PwnAuth).\nThe default permissions/scope for the PwnAuth toolkit are user.read, offline_access, mail.readwrite, mail.send, and files.read.all.\nConsent to applications with these permissions should be rare, especially as the knownApplications list is expanded. Public contributions to expand this filter are welcome!\nFor further information on AuditLogs please see https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities.'\n",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "enabled": true,
        "query": "let detectionTime = 1d;\nlet joinLookback = 14d;\nAuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(detectionTime)\n| where LoggedByService =~ \"Core Directory\"\n| where Category =~ \"ApplicationManagement\"\n| where OperationName =~ \"Consent to application\"\n| where TargetResources has \"offline\"\n| mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on \n  (\n      where TargetResource.type =~ \"ServicePrincipal\"\n      | extend AppDisplayName = tostring(TargetResource.displayName),\n               AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id),\n               props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties\n  )\n| where AppClientId !in ((externaldata(knownAppClientId:string, knownAppDisplayName:string)[@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Microsoft.OAuth.KnownApplications.csv\"] with (format=\"csv\")))\n| mv-apply ConsentFull = props on \n  (\n      where ConsentFull.displayName =~ \"ConsentAction.Permissions\"\n  )\n| parse ConsentFull with * \"ConsentType: \" GrantConsentType \", Scope: \" GrantScope1 \"]\" *\n| where ConsentFull has_all (\"user.read\", \"offline_access\", \"mail.readwrite\", \"mail.send\", \"files.read.all\")\n| where GrantConsentType != \"AllPrincipals\" // NOTE: we are ignoring if OAuth application was granted to all users via an admin - but admin due diligence should be audited occasionally\n| extend GrantIpAddress = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))\n| extend GrantInitiatedBy = iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName))\n| mv-apply AdditionalDetail = AdditionalDetails on \n  (\n      where AdditionalDetail.key =~ \"User-Agent\"\n      | extend GrantUserAgent = AdditionalDetail.value\n  )\n| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, OperationName, ConsentFull, CorrelationId\n| join kind = leftouter (AuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)\n| where LoggedByService =~ \"Core Directory\"\n| where Category =~ \"ApplicationManagement\"\n| where OperationName =~ \"Add service principal\"\n  | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on \n      (\n          where TargetResource.type =~ \"ServicePrincipal\"\n          | extend props = TargetResource.modifiedProperties,\n                  AppClientId = tostring(TargetResource.id)\n      )\n  | mv-apply Property = props on \n      (\n          where Property.displayName =~ \"AppAddress\" and Property.newValue has \"AddressType\"\n          | extend AppReplyURLs = trim('\"',tostring(Property.newValue))\n      )\n| distinct AppClientId, tostring(AppReplyURLs)\n)\non AppClientId\n| join kind = innerunique (AuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(joinLookback)\n| where LoggedByService =~ \"Core Directory\"\n| where Category =~ \"ApplicationManagement\"\n| where OperationName =~ \"Add OAuth2PermissionGrant\" or OperationName =~ \"Add delegated permission grant\"\n      | mv-apply TargetResource = TargetResources on \n          (\n              where TargetResource.type =~ \"ServicePrincipal\" and array_length(TargetResource.modifiedProperties) > 0 and isnotnull(TargetResource.displayName)\n              | extend GrantAuthentication = tostring(TargetResource.displayName)\n          )\n| extend GrantOperation = OperationName\n| project GrantAuthentication, GrantOperation, CorrelationId\n) on CorrelationId\n| project TimeGenerated, GrantConsentType, GrantScope1, GrantInitiatedBy, AppDisplayName, AppReplyURLs, GrantIpAddress, GrantUserAgent, AppClientId, GrantAuthentication, OperationName, GrantOperation, CorrelationId, ConsentFull\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Name = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedBy,'@',0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GrantInitiatedBy,'@',1)[0])\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P14D",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0,
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CredentialAccess",
          "DefenseEvasion"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1528",
          "T1550"
        ],
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "39198934-62a0-4781-8416-a81265c03fd6",
        "customDetails": null,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "identifier": "Name",
                "columnName": "Name"
              },
              {
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix",
                "columnName": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "identifier": "Address",
                "columnName": "GrantIpAddress"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Azure Active Directory/Analytic Rules/MaliciousOAuthApp_PwnAuth.yaml",
        "status": "Available",
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1"
      }
    }
  ]
}