Privilege escalation via Glue policy

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Id	370f0e5e-da1d-4a14-8ced-d1d7ab66a8d7
Rulename	Privilege escalation via Glue policy
Description	Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Glue policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1484
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaGluePolicy.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	370f0e5e-da1d-4a14-8ced-d1d7ab66a8d7.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "glue:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "glue:CreateDevEndpoint" and Action contains "glue:GetDevEndpoints") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "glue:Create*" and Action contains "glue:Get*")) or (Action contains "glue:*") or (Action contains "glue:GetDevEndpoints" and Action contains "glue:UpdateDevEndpoint") or (Action contains "glue:Get*" and Action contains "glue:Update*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

YAML

relevantTechniques:
- T1484
name: Privilege escalation via Glue policy
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
  entityType: IP
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 370f0e5e-da1d-4a14-8ced-d1d7ab66a8d7
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
version: 1.0.1
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaGluePolicy.yaml
queryPeriod: 1d
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1d
severity: Medium
status: Available
description: |
    'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Glue policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
    | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
    | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
    | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
    | mvexpand Statement
    | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
    | extend Action = tostring(Action)
    | where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "glue:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "glue:CreateDevEndpoint" and Action contains "glue:GetDevEndpoints") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "glue:Create*" and Action contains "glue:Get*")) or (Action contains "glue:*") or (Action contains "glue:GetDevEndpoints" and Action contains "glue:UpdateDevEndpoint") or (Action contains "glue:Get*" and Action contains "glue:Update*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
    | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
    | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
    | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
    | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
      AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
    | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
    | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
triggerOperator: gt

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/370f0e5e-da1d-4a14-8ced-d1d7ab66a8d7')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/370f0e5e-da1d-4a14-8ced-d1d7ab66a8d7')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "370f0e5e-da1d-4a14-8ced-d1d7ab66a8d7",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Glue policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'\n",
        "displayName": "Privilege escalation via Glue policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaGluePolicy.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n  | where EventName in (\"PutUserPolicy\",\"PutRolePolicy\",\"PutGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)\n  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement\n  | mvexpand Statement\n  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)\n  | extend Action = tostring(Action)\n  | where Effect =~ \"Allow\" and ((((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"glue:*\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"glue:CreateDevEndpoint\" and Action contains \"glue:GetDevEndpoints\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"glue:Create*\" and Action contains \"glue:Get*\")) or (Action contains \"glue:*\") or (Action contains \"glue:GetDevEndpoints\" and Action contains \"glue:UpdateDevEndpoint\") or (Action contains \"glue:Get*\" and Action contains \"glue:Update*\")) and Resource == \"*\" and Condition == \"\"\n  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName\n  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}