Regsvr32 Rundll32 Image Loads Abnormal Extension

DeviceImageLoadEvents 
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| where FileName !endswith ".dll"
| join (
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| where RemoteIPType == "Public"
) on InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")

OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Microsoft Defender XDR/Analytic Rules/Defense Evasion/Regsvr32Rundll32ImageLoadsAbnormalExtension.yaml
status: Available
id: 36fbd4e7-5630-4414-aa42-702a7fdded21
query: |
  DeviceImageLoadEvents 
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
  | where FileName !endswith ".dll"
  | join (
  DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
  | where RemoteIPType == "Public"
  ) on InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
  | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
  | extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
  | extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")  
tags:
- Defense Evasion
- Image Load
- Regsvr32 Abuse
- Rundll32 Abuse
description: |
  This query is looking for regsvr32.exe or rundll32.exe loading DLL images with other extensions than .dll.
  Joins the data to public network events.
  References:
  https://threathunt.blog/running-live-malware-for-threat-hunting-purposes/  
name: Regsvr32 Rundll32 Image Loads Abnormal Extension
relevantTechniques:
- T1218.010
- T1218.011
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: DeviceName
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: DnsDomain
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: LocalIP
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: RemoteIP
- entityType: URL
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Url
    columnName: RemoteUrl
triggerThreshold: 0
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
  - DeviceNetworkEvents
  connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
triggerOperator: gt

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/36fbd4e7-5630-4414-aa42-702a7fdded21')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/36fbd4e7-5630-4414-aa42-702a7fdded21')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "36fbd4e7-5630-4414-aa42-702a7fdded21",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "This query is looking for regsvr32.exe or rundll32.exe loading DLL images with other extensions than .dll.\nJoins the data to public network events.\nReferences:\nhttps://threathunt.blog/running-live-malware-for-threat-hunting-purposes/\n",
        "displayName": "Regsvr32 Rundll32 Image Loads Abnormal Extension",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "DnsDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "LocalIP",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "RemoteIP",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "URL",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "RemoteUrl",
                "identifier": "Url"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Microsoft Defender XDR/Analytic Rules/Defense Evasion/Regsvr32Rundll32ImageLoadsAbnormalExtension.yaml",
        "query": "DeviceImageLoadEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (\"rundll32.exe\",\"regsvr32.exe\")\n| where FileName !endswith \".dll\"\n| join (\nDeviceNetworkEvents\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (\"rundll32.exe\",\"regsvr32.exe\")\n| where RemoteIPType == \"Public\"\n) on InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessCommandLine\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessParentFileName\n| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)\n| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), \"\")\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1218.010",
          "T1218.011"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "Defense Evasion",
          "Image Load",
          "Regsvr32 Abuse",
          "Rundll32 Abuse"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1218"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.0",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}