New PA PCA or PCAS added to Azure DevOps

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Id	35ce9aff-1708-45b8-a295-5e9a307f5f17
Rulename	New PA, PCA, or PCAS added to Azure DevOps
Description	In order for an attacker to be able to conduct many potential attacks against Azure DevOps they will need to gain elevated permissions. This detection looks for users being granted key administrative permissions. If the principal of least privilege is applied, the number of users granted these permissions should be small. Note that permissions can also be granted via Microsoft Entra ID Protection groups and monitoring of these should also be conducted.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	InitialAccess
Techniques	T1078.004
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/AzureDevOpsAuditing/Analytic Rules/NewPAPCAPCASaddedtoADO.yaml
Version	1.0.6
Arm template	35ce9aff-1708-45b8-a295-5e9a307f5f17.json

KQL

ADOAuditLogs
| where OperationName =~ "Group.UpdateGroupMembership.Add"
| where Details has_any ("Project Administrators", "Project Collection Administrators", "Project Collection Service Accounts", "Build Administrator")
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Details, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, AuthenticationMechanism, ScopeDisplayName
| extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| extend ActorUserId = tostring(Data.MemberId)
| project timekey, ActorUserId, AddingUser=ActorUPN, TimeAdded=TimeGenerated, PermissionGrantDetails = Details
// Get details of operations conducted by user soon after elevation of permissions
| join (ADOAuditLogs
| extend ActorUserId = tostring(Data.MemberId)
| extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)) on timekey, ActorUserId
| summarize ActionsWhenAdded = make_set(OperationName) by ActorUPN, AddingUser, TimeAdded, PermissionGrantDetails, IpAddress, UserAgent
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])
| extend AddingUserAccountName = tostring(split(AddingUser, "@")[0]), AddingUserAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AddingUser, "@")[1])

YAML

queryPeriod: 1d
severity: Medium
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/AzureDevOpsAuditing/Analytic Rules/NewPAPCAPCASaddedtoADO.yaml
status: Available
description: |
  'In order for an attacker to be able to conduct many potential attacks against Azure DevOps they will need to gain elevated permissions. 
  This detection looks for users being granted key administrative permissions. If the principal of least privilege is applied, the number of users granted these permissions should be small. Note that permissions can also be granted via Microsoft Entra ID Protection groups and monitoring of these should also be conducted.'  
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: ActorUPN
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: AddingUser
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AddingUserAccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AddingUserAccountUPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IpAddress
  entityType: IP
requiredDataConnectors: []
name: New PA, PCA, or PCAS added to Azure DevOps
triggerThreshold: 0
query: |
  ADOAuditLogs
  | where OperationName =~ "Group.UpdateGroupMembership.Add"
  | where Details has_any ("Project Administrators", "Project Collection Administrators", "Project Collection Service Accounts", "Build Administrator")
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, Details, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, AuthenticationMechanism, ScopeDisplayName
  | extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
  | extend ActorUserId = tostring(Data.MemberId)
  | project timekey, ActorUserId, AddingUser=ActorUPN, TimeAdded=TimeGenerated, PermissionGrantDetails = Details
  // Get details of operations conducted by user soon after elevation of permissions
  | join (ADOAuditLogs
  | extend ActorUserId = tostring(Data.MemberId)
  | extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)) on timekey, ActorUserId
  | summarize ActionsWhenAdded = make_set(OperationName) by ActorUPN, AddingUser, TimeAdded, PermissionGrantDetails, IpAddress, UserAgent
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])
  | extend AddingUserAccountName = tostring(split(AddingUser, "@")[0]), AddingUserAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AddingUser, "@")[1])  
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- InitialAccess
id: 35ce9aff-1708-45b8-a295-5e9a307f5f17
version: 1.0.6
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1d

ARM