Hijack Execution Flow - DLL Side-Loading

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Id	3084b487-fad6-4000-9544-6085b9657290
Rulename	Hijack Execution Flow - DLL Side-Loading
Description	This detection tries to identify all DLLs loaded by “high integrity” processes and cross-checks the DLL paths against FileCreate/FileModify events of the same DLL by a medium integrity process. Of course, we need to do some magic to filter out false positives as much as possible. So any FileCreate/FileModify done by “NT Authoriy\System” and the “RID 500” users aren’t interesting. Also, we only want to see the FileCreate/FileModify actions which are performed with a default or limited token elevation. If done with a full elevated token, the user is apparently admin already.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Persistence PrivilegeEscalation DefenseEvasion
Techniques	T1574.002
Required data connectors	MicrosoftThreatProtection
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/DLLSideLoading.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	3084b487-fad6-4000-9544-6085b9657290.json

KQL

let imls = materialize(
    DeviceImageLoadEvents
    | where InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel in ("High", "System") and FileName !endswith ".exe"
    | project FolderPath=tolower(FolderPath), InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, DeviceId, DeviceName
    | distinct FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, DeviceId, DeviceName
);
imls
| join (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where FolderPath in~ ((imls | project FolderPath)) and ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified") and
    InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel !in ("High", "System", "") and InitiatingProcessAccountSid != "S-1-5-18" and
    InitiatingProcessTokenElevation in ("TokenElevationTypeDefault", "TokenElevationTypeLimited") and InitiatingProcessAccountSid !endswith "-500"
    | extend FolderPath=tolower(FolderPath)
) on FolderPath, DeviceId, DeviceName
| project-away FolderPath1

YAML

id: 3084b487-fad6-4000-9544-6085b9657290
relevantTechniques:
- T1574.002
description: |
  This detection tries to identify all DLLs loaded by "high integrity" processes and cross-checks the DLL paths against FileCreate/FileModify events of the same DLL by a medium integrity process.
  Of course, we need to do some magic to filter out false positives as much as possible. So any FileCreate/FileModify done by "NT Authoriy\System" and the "RID 500" users aren't interesting.
  Also, we only want to see the FileCreate/FileModify actions which are performed with a default or limited token elevation. If done with a full elevated token, the user is apparently admin already.  
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/DLLSideLoading.yaml
query: |
  let imls = materialize(
      DeviceImageLoadEvents
      | where InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel in ("High", "System") and FileName !endswith ".exe"
      | project FolderPath=tolower(FolderPath), InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, DeviceId, DeviceName
      | distinct FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, DeviceId, DeviceName
  );
  imls
  | join (
      DeviceFileEvents
      | where FolderPath in~ ((imls | project FolderPath)) and ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified") and
      InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel !in ("High", "System", "") and InitiatingProcessAccountSid != "S-1-5-18" and
      InitiatingProcessTokenElevation in ("TokenElevationTypeDefault", "TokenElevationTypeLimited") and InitiatingProcessAccountSid !endswith "-500"
      | extend FolderPath=tolower(FolderPath)
  ) on FolderPath, DeviceId, DeviceName
  | project-away FolderPath1  
queryFrequency: 1h
status: Available
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: DeviceName
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Sid
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountSid
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: CommandLine
    columnName: InitiatingProcessCommandLine
  entityType: Process
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- Persistence
- PrivilegeEscalation
- DefenseEvasion
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceFileEvents
  - DeviceImageLoadEvents
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 1.0.1
queryPeriod: 1h
name: Hijack Execution Flow - DLL Side-Loading

ARM