AD FS Remote Auth Sync Connection
| Id | 2f4165a6-c4fb-4e94-861e-37f1b4d6c0e6 |
| Rulename | AD FS Remote Auth Sync Connection |
| Description | This detection uses Security events from the “AD FS Auditing” provider to detect suspicious authentication events on an AD FS server. The results then get correlated with events from the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) to detect suspicious incoming network traffic on port 80 on the AD FS server. This could be a sign of a threat actor trying to use replication services on the AD FS server to get its configuration settings and extract sensitive information such as AD FS certificates. In order to use this query you need to enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS Server. References: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672 |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | Collection |
| Techniques | T1005 |
| Required data connectors | SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1d |
| Query period | 1d |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/ADFSRemoteAuthSyncConnection.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.2 |
| Arm template | 2f4165a6-c4fb-4e94-861e-37f1b4d6c0e6.json |
// Adjust this to use a longer timeframe to identify ADFS servers
//let lookback = 0d;
// Adjust this to adjust detection timeframe
//let timeframe = 1d;
// SamAccountName of AD FS Service Account. Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account
//let adfsuser = 'adfsadmin';
// Identify ADFS Servers
let ADFS_Servers = (
SecurityEvent
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventSourceName == 'AD FS Auditing'
| distinct Computer
);
SecurityEvent
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
// A token of type 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/servicemodel/tokens/SecureConversation'
// for relying party '-' was successfully authenticated.
| where EventID == 412
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])
| join kind=inner
(
SecurityEvent
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
// Events to identify caller identity from event 412
| where EventID == 501
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| where tostring(EventData[1]) contains 'identity/claims/name'
| extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])
| extend ClaimsName = tostring(EventData[2])
// Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account
//| where ClaimsName contains adfsuser
)
on $left.InstanceId == $right.InstanceId
| join kind=inner
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5156
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID)
| extend DestPort = column_ifexists("DestPort", ""),
Direction = column_ifexists("Direction", ""),
Application = column_ifexists("Application", ""),
DestAddress = column_ifexists("DestAddress", ""),
SourceAddress = column_ifexists("SourceAddress", ""),
SourcePort = column_ifexists("SourcePort", "")
// Look for inbound connections from endpoints on port 80
| where DestPort == 80 and Direction == '%%14592' and Application == 'System'
| where DestAddress !in ('::1','0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1')
)
on $left.Computer == $right.Computer
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ClaimsName, SourceAddress, SourcePort
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])
name: AD FS Remote Auth Sync Connection
query: |
// Adjust this to use a longer timeframe to identify ADFS servers
//let lookback = 0d;
// Adjust this to adjust detection timeframe
//let timeframe = 1d;
// SamAccountName of AD FS Service Account. Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account
//let adfsuser = 'adfsadmin';
// Identify ADFS Servers
let ADFS_Servers = (
SecurityEvent
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventSourceName == 'AD FS Auditing'
| distinct Computer
);
SecurityEvent
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
// A token of type 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/servicemodel/tokens/SecureConversation'
// for relying party '-' was successfully authenticated.
| where EventID == 412
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])
| join kind=inner
(
SecurityEvent
//| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
// Events to identify caller identity from event 412
| where EventID == 501
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| where tostring(EventData[1]) contains 'identity/claims/name'
| extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])
| extend ClaimsName = tostring(EventData[2])
// Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account
//| where ClaimsName contains adfsuser
)
on $left.InstanceId == $right.InstanceId
| join kind=inner
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5156
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID)
| extend DestPort = column_ifexists("DestPort", ""),
Direction = column_ifexists("Direction", ""),
Application = column_ifexists("Application", ""),
DestAddress = column_ifexists("DestAddress", ""),
SourceAddress = column_ifexists("SourceAddress", ""),
SourcePort = column_ifexists("SourcePort", "")
// Look for inbound connections from endpoints on port 80
| where DestPort == 80 and Direction == '%%14592' and Application == 'System'
| where DestAddress !in ('::1','0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1')
)
on $left.Computer == $right.Computer
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ClaimsName, SourceAddress, SourcePort
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])
description: |
'This detection uses Security events from the "AD FS Auditing" provider to detect suspicious authentication events on an AD FS server. The results then get
correlated with events from the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) to detect suspicious incoming network traffic on port 80 on the AD FS server.
This could be a sign of a threat actor trying to use replication services on the AD FS server to get its configuration settings and extract
sensitive information such as AD FS certificates.
In order to use this query you need to enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS Server.
References:
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging
https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672
'
tactics:
- Collection
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
queryPeriod: 1d
queryFrequency: 1d
status: Available
triggerThreshold: 0
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/ADFSRemoteAuthSyncConnection.yaml
id: 2f4165a6-c4fb-4e94-861e-37f1b4d6c0e6
triggerOperator: gt
version: 1.0.2
relevantTechniques:
- T1005
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: ClaimsName
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: AccountNTDomain
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceAddress
tags:
- SimuLand
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/2f4165a6-c4fb-4e94-861e-37f1b4d6c0e6')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/2f4165a6-c4fb-4e94-861e-37f1b4d6c0e6')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "2f4165a6-c4fb-4e94-861e-37f1b4d6c0e6",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This detection uses Security events from the \"AD FS Auditing\" provider to detect suspicious authentication events on an AD FS server. The results then get\ncorrelated with events from the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) to detect suspicious incoming network traffic on port 80 on the AD FS server.\nThis could be a sign of a threat actor trying to use replication services on the AD FS server to get its configuration settings and extract\nsensitive information such as AD FS certificates.\nIn order to use this query you need to enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS Server.\nReferences: \nhttps://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging\nhttps://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672\n'\n",
"displayName": "AD FS Remote Auth Sync Connection",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "ClaimsName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountNTDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Computer",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostName",
"identifier": "HostName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostNameDomain",
"identifier": "DnsDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SourceAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/ADFSRemoteAuthSyncConnection.yaml",
"query": "// Adjust this to use a longer timeframe to identify ADFS servers\n//let lookback = 0d;\n// Adjust this to adjust detection timeframe\n//let timeframe = 1d;\n// SamAccountName of AD FS Service Account. Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account\n//let adfsuser = 'adfsadmin';\n// Identify ADFS Servers\nlet ADFS_Servers = (\n SecurityEvent\n //| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)\n | where EventSourceName == 'AD FS Auditing'\n | distinct Computer\n);\nSecurityEvent\n //| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)\n // A token of type 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/servicemodel/tokens/SecureConversation'\n // for relying party '-' was successfully authenticated.\n | where EventID == 412\n | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data\n | extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])\n| join kind=inner\n(\n SecurityEvent\n //| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)\n // Events to identify caller identity from event 412\n | where EventID == 501\n | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data\n | where tostring(EventData[1]) contains 'identity/claims/name'\n | extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])\n | extend ClaimsName = tostring(EventData[2])\n // Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account\n //| where ClaimsName contains adfsuser\n)\non $left.InstanceId == $right.InstanceId\n| join kind=inner\n(\n SecurityEvent\n | where EventID == 5156\n | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)\n | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data\n | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData\n | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)\n | extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', \"\")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', \"\")\n | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID)\n | extend DestPort = column_ifexists(\"DestPort\", \"\"),\n Direction = column_ifexists(\"Direction\", \"\"),\n Application = column_ifexists(\"Application\", \"\"),\n DestAddress = column_ifexists(\"DestAddress\", \"\"),\n SourceAddress = column_ifexists(\"SourceAddress\", \"\"),\n SourcePort = column_ifexists(\"SourcePort\", \"\")\n // Look for inbound connections from endpoints on port 80\n | where DestPort == 80 and Direction == '%%14592' and Application == 'System'\n | where DestAddress !in ('::1','0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1') \n)\non $left.Computer == $right.Computer\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ClaimsName, SourceAddress, SourcePort\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\\')[0])\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Collection"
],
"tags": [
"SimuLand"
],
"techniques": [
"T1005"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.2",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}