Suspicious Sign In by Entra ID Connect Sync Account

Back


Id	2cd8b3d5-c9e0-4be3-80f7-0469d511c3f6
Rulename	Suspicious Sign In by Entra ID Connect Sync Account
Description	This query looks for sign ins by the Microsoft Entra ID Connect Sync account to Azure where properties about the logon are anomalous. This query uses Microsoft Sentinel’s UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties. A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	InitialAccess
Techniques	T1078.004
Required data connectors	BehaviorAnalytics
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/BehaviorAnalytics/SuspiciousSigninByAADConnectAccount.yaml
Version	1.0.3
Arm template	2cd8b3d5-c9e0-4be3-80f7-0469d511c3f6.json

KQL

BehaviorAnalytics
// User modification is expected from this account so focus on logons
| where ActivityType =~ "LogOn"
| where UserName startswith "Sync_" and UsersInsights.AccountDisplayName =~ "On-Premises Directory Synchronization Service Account"
// Filter out this expected activity
| where ActivityInsights.App !~ "Microsoft Azure Active Directory Connect"
| where InvestigationPriority > 0
| extend Name = split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1]

YAML

relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: UserPrincipalName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: Name
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: UPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIPAddress
    identifier: Address
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DestinationDevice
    identifier: HostName
version: 1.0.3
id: 2cd8b3d5-c9e0-4be3-80f7-0469d511c3f6
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1h
description: |
  'This query looks for sign ins by the Microsoft Entra ID Connect Sync account to Azure where properties about the logon are anomalous.
  This query uses Microsoft Sentinel's UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties.
  A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be 
  reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.'  
metadata:
  source:
    kind: Community
  support:
    tier: Community
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Identity
    - Security - Threat Protection
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
  dataTypes:
  - BehaviorAnalytics
triggerOperator: gt
name: Suspicious Sign In by Entra ID Connect Sync Account
tactics:
- InitialAccess
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    This query looks for sign ins by the Azure AD Connect Sync account to Azure where properties about the logon are anomalous.
    This query uses Microsoft Sentinel's UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties.
    A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be 
    reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.
    In this case {{UserPrincipalName}} logged in from {{SourceIPAddress}}.    
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Suspicious Sign In by AAD Connect Sync Account {{UserPrincipalName}} from {{SourceIPAddress}}
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/BehaviorAnalytics/SuspiciousSigninByAADConnectAccount.yaml
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
query: |
  BehaviorAnalytics
  // User modification is expected from this account so focus on logons
  | where ActivityType =~ "LogOn"
  | where UserName startswith "Sync_" and UsersInsights.AccountDisplayName =~ "On-Premises Directory Synchronization Service Account"
  // Filter out this expected activity
  | where ActivityInsights.App !~ "Microsoft Azure Active Directory Connect"
  | where InvestigationPriority > 0
  | extend Name = split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1]  
status: Available

ARM