Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call

let suspiciousCmdLineKeywords = dynamic(["http://", "https://"]);
// Identify exchange servers based on known paths
// Summarize these to get a list of exchange server hostnames
let exchangeServers = W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any("/owa/","/ews/","/ecp/","/autodiscover/")
// Only where successful, rule out failed scanning
| where scStatus startswith "2"
| summarize by Computer;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceName in~ (exchangeServers)
// Where the IIS worker process initiated CMD or PowerShell
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "w3wp.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")
// Where CMD or PowerShell command line included parameters associated with CVE-2022-41040/CVE-2022-41082 exploitation
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any(suspiciousCmdLineKeywords)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName
| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)

name: Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call
description: |
  'This query dynamically identifies Exchange servers and then looks for instances where the IIS worker process
  initiates a call out to a remote URL using either cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This behaviour was described as
  post-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was
  use to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.'  
tactics:
- Execution
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - W3CIISLog
  connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS)
- dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
  connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
queryPeriod: 1d
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090
triggerOperator: gt
version: 1.1.1
query: |
  let suspiciousCmdLineKeywords = dynamic(["http://", "https://"]);
  // Identify exchange servers based on known paths
  // Summarize these to get a list of exchange server hostnames
  let exchangeServers = W3CIISLog
  | where csUriStem has_any("/owa/","/ews/","/ecp/","/autodiscover/")
  // Only where successful, rule out failed scanning
  | where scStatus startswith "2"
  | summarize by Computer;
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where DeviceName in~ (exchangeServers)
  // Where the IIS worker process initiated CMD or PowerShell
  | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "w3wp.exe"
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")
  // Where CMD or PowerShell command line included parameters associated with CVE-2022-41040/CVE-2022-41082 exploitation
  | where ProcessCommandLine has_any(suspiciousCmdLineKeywords)
  | project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName
  | extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)  
metadata:
  support:
    tier: Community
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Community
  source:
    kind: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Application
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Account
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: AccountDomain
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: DeviceName
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: HostNameDomain
relevantTechniques:
- T1059.001
- T1059.003
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ExchangeWorkerProcessMakingRemoteCall.yaml

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query dynamically identifies Exchange servers and then looks for instances where the IIS worker process\ninitiates a call out to a remote URL using either cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This behaviour was described as\npost-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was\nuse to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.'\n",
        "displayName": "Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Account",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ExchangeWorkerProcessMakingRemoteCall.yaml",
        "query": "let suspiciousCmdLineKeywords = dynamic([\"http://\", \"https://\"]);\n// Identify exchange servers based on known paths\n// Summarize these to get a list of exchange server hostnames\nlet exchangeServers = W3CIISLog\n| where csUriStem has_any(\"/owa/\",\"/ews/\",\"/ecp/\",\"/autodiscover/\")\n// Only where successful, rule out failed scanning\n| where scStatus startswith \"2\"\n| summarize by Computer;\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where DeviceName in~ (exchangeServers)\n// Where the IIS worker process initiated CMD or PowerShell\n| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == \"w3wp.exe\"\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any(\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\")\n// Where CMD or PowerShell command line included parameters associated with CVE-2022-41040/CVE-2022-41082 exploitation\n| where ProcessCommandLine has_any(suspiciousCmdLineKeywords)\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName\n| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, \"\\\\\", AccountName)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1059"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.1.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}