Starting or Stopping HealthService to Avoid Detection

Back


Id	2bc7b4ae-eeaa-4538-ba15-ef298ec1ffae
Rulename	Starting or Stopping HealthService to Avoid Detection
Description	This query detects events where an actor is stopping or starting HealthService to disable telemetry collection/detection from the agent. The query requires a SACL to audit for access request to the service.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	DefenseEvasion
Techniques	T1562.001
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/StartStopHealthService.yaml
Version	1.0.2
Arm template	2bc7b4ae-eeaa-4538-ba15-ef298ec1ffae.json

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4656
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, TargetAccount, Computer, EventSourceName, Channel, Task, Level, EventID, Activity, TargetLogonId, SourceComputerId, EventOriginId, Type, _ResourceId, TenantId, SourceSystem, ManagementGroupName, IpAddress, Account)
| extend ObjectServer = column_ifexists('ObjectServer', ""), ObjectType = column_ifexists('ObjectType', ""), ObjectName = column_ifexists('ObjectName', "")
| where isnotempty(ObjectServer) and isnotempty(ObjectType) and isnotempty(ObjectName)
| where ObjectServer =~ "SC Manager" and ObjectType =~ "SERVICE OBJECT" and ObjectName =~ "HealthService"
// Comment out the join below if the SACL only audits users that are part of the Network logon users, i.e. with user/group target pointing to "NU."
| join kind=leftouter (
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4624
) on TargetLogonId
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TargetAccount, IpAddress,TargetLogonId, ObjectServer, ObjectType, ObjectName
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(TargetAccount, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(TargetAccount, @'\')[0])
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

YAML

query: |
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4656
  | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
  | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
  | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
  | extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
  | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, TargetAccount, Computer, EventSourceName, Channel, Task, Level, EventID, Activity, TargetLogonId, SourceComputerId, EventOriginId, Type, _ResourceId, TenantId, SourceSystem, ManagementGroupName, IpAddress, Account)
  | extend ObjectServer = column_ifexists('ObjectServer', ""), ObjectType = column_ifexists('ObjectType', ""), ObjectName = column_ifexists('ObjectName', "")
  | where isnotempty(ObjectServer) and isnotempty(ObjectType) and isnotempty(ObjectName)
  | where ObjectServer =~ "SC Manager" and ObjectType =~ "SERVICE OBJECT" and ObjectName =~ "HealthService"
  // Comment out the join below if the SACL only audits users that are part of the Network logon users, i.e. with user/group target pointing to "NU."
  | join kind=leftouter (
    SecurityEvent
    | where EventID == 4624
  ) on TargetLogonId
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TargetAccount, IpAddress,TargetLogonId, ObjectServer, ObjectType, ObjectName
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(TargetAccount, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(TargetAccount, @'\')[0])
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
queryPeriod: 1d
queryFrequency: 1d
status: Available
id: 2bc7b4ae-eeaa-4538-ba15-ef298ec1ffae
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: TargetAccount
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountNTDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Computer
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: DnsDomain
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: IpAddress
    identifier: Address
relevantTechniques:
- T1562.001
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/StartStopHealthService.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
- connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
name: Starting or Stopping HealthService to Avoid Detection
description: |
  'This query detects events where an actor is stopping or starting HealthService to disable telemetry collection/detection from the agent.
   The query requires a SACL to audit for access request to the service.'  
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
tags:
- Solorigate
- NOBELIUM
severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled
triggerOperator: gt

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/2bc7b4ae-eeaa-4538-ba15-ef298ec1ffae')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/2bc7b4ae-eeaa-4538-ba15-ef298ec1ffae')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "2bc7b4ae-eeaa-4538-ba15-ef298ec1ffae",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query detects events where an actor is stopping or starting HealthService to disable telemetry collection/detection from the agent.\n The query requires a SACL to audit for access request to the service.'\n",
        "displayName": "Starting or Stopping HealthService to Avoid Detection",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "TargetAccount",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountNTDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/StartStopHealthService.yaml",
        "query": "SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4656\n| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data\n| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData\n| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)\n| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', \"\")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', \"\")\n| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, TargetAccount, Computer, EventSourceName, Channel, Task, Level, EventID, Activity, TargetLogonId, SourceComputerId, EventOriginId, Type, _ResourceId, TenantId, SourceSystem, ManagementGroupName, IpAddress, Account)\n| extend ObjectServer = column_ifexists('ObjectServer', \"\"), ObjectType = column_ifexists('ObjectType', \"\"), ObjectName = column_ifexists('ObjectName', \"\")\n| where isnotempty(ObjectServer) and isnotempty(ObjectType) and isnotempty(ObjectName)\n| where ObjectServer =~ \"SC Manager\" and ObjectType =~ \"SERVICE OBJECT\" and ObjectName =~ \"HealthService\"\n// Comment out the join below if the SACL only audits users that are part of the Network logon users, i.e. with user/group target pointing to \"NU.\"\n| join kind=leftouter (\n  SecurityEvent\n  | where EventID == 4624\n) on TargetLogonId\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TargetAccount, IpAddress,TargetLogonId, ObjectServer, ObjectType, ObjectName\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(TargetAccount, @'\\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(TargetAccount, @'\\')[0])\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1562.001"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "Solorigate",
          "NOBELIUM"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1562"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}