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Possible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Abuse

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Id2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f
RulenamePossible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Abuse
DescriptionThis query identifies Active Directory computer objects modifications that allow an adversary to abuse the Resource-based constrained delegation.

This query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is “computer” and the LDAP Display Name is “msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity” which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation.

Ref: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
SeverityMedium
TacticsPrivilegeEscalation
TechniquesT1134
Required data connectorsSecurityEvents
KindScheduled
Query frequency1h
Query period1h
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/PotenialResourceBasedConstrainedDelegationAbuse.yaml
Version1.0.3
Arm template2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f.json
Deploy To Azure
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136 
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectClass">' ObjectClass "<" *
| parse EventData with * 'AttributeLDAPDisplayName">' AttributeLDAPDisplayName "<" *
| where ObjectClass == "computer" and AttributeLDAPDisplayName == "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN, AttributeLDAPDisplayName
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex
id: 2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f
name: Possible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Abuse
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
triggerOperator: gt
severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/PotenialResourceBasedConstrainedDelegationAbuse.yaml
kind: Scheduled
description: |
  'This query identifies Active Directory computer objects modifications that allow an adversary to abuse the Resource-based constrained delegation. 
  This query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is "computer" and the LDAP Display Name is "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation.
  Ref: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html'  
relevantTechniques:
- T1134
metadata:
  support:
    tier: Community
  source:
    kind: Community
  author:
    name: Vasileios Paschalidis
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
    - Identity
queryPeriod: 1h
query: |
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 5136 
  | parse EventData with * 'ObjectClass">' ObjectClass "<" *
  | parse EventData with * 'AttributeLDAPDisplayName">' AttributeLDAPDisplayName "<" *
  | where ObjectClass == "computer" and AttributeLDAPDisplayName == "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"
  | parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN, AttributeLDAPDisplayName
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | project-away DomainIndex  
queryFrequency: 1h
version: 1.0.3
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: SubjectAccount
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: SubjectUserName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: SubjectDomainName
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Sid
    columnName: SubjectUserSid
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: HostNameDomain
  entityType: Host
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query identifies Active Directory computer objects modifications that allow an adversary to abuse the Resource-based constrained delegation. \nThis query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is \"computer\" and the LDAP Display Name is \"msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity\" which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation.\nRef: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html'\n",
        "displayName": "Possible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Abuse",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectAccount",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectUserName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectDomainName",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectUserSid",
                "identifier": "Sid"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/PotenialResourceBasedConstrainedDelegationAbuse.yaml",
        "query": "SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 5136 \n| parse EventData with * 'ObjectClass\">' ObjectClass \"<\" *\n| parse EventData with * 'AttributeLDAPDisplayName\">' AttributeLDAPDisplayName \"<\" *\n| where ObjectClass == \"computer\" and AttributeLDAPDisplayName == \"msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity\"\n| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN\">' ObjectDN \"<\" *\n| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN, AttributeLDAPDisplayName\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| project-away DomainIndex\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1134"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.3",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}