Possible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Abuse

Back


Id	2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f
Rulename	Possible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Abuse
Description	This query identifies Active Directory computer objects modifications that allow an adversary to abuse the Resource-based constrained delegation. This query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is “computer” and the LDAP Display Name is “msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity” which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation. Ref: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1134
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/PotenialResourceBasedConstrainedDelegationAbuse.yaml
Version	1.0.3
Arm template	2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f.json

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136 
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectClass">' ObjectClass "<" *
| parse EventData with * 'AttributeLDAPDisplayName">' AttributeLDAPDisplayName "<" *
| where ObjectClass == "computer" and AttributeLDAPDisplayName == "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN, AttributeLDAPDisplayName
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex

YAML

queryPeriod: 1h
query: |
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 5136 
  | parse EventData with * 'ObjectClass">' ObjectClass "<" *
  | parse EventData with * 'AttributeLDAPDisplayName">' AttributeLDAPDisplayName "<" *
  | where ObjectClass == "computer" and AttributeLDAPDisplayName == "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"
  | parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN, AttributeLDAPDisplayName
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | project-away DomainIndex  
name: Possible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Abuse
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SubjectAccount
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: SubjectUserName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: SubjectDomainName
    identifier: NTDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SubjectUserSid
    identifier: Sid
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Computer
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/PotenialResourceBasedConstrainedDelegationAbuse.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
description: |
  'This query identifies Active Directory computer objects modifications that allow an adversary to abuse the Resource-based constrained delegation. 
  This query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is "computer" and the LDAP Display Name is "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation.
  Ref: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html'  
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.3
metadata:
  author:
    name: Vasileios Paschalidis
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
    - Identity
  support:
    tier: Community
  source:
    kind: Community
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1134
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
id: 2937bc6b-7cda-4fba-b452-ea43ba8e835f

ARM