Detect Malicious Usage of Recovery Tools to Delete Backup Files

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Id	259de2c1-c546-4c6d-a17c-df639722f4d7
Rulename	Detect Malicious Usage of Recovery Tools to Delete Backup Files
Description	This analytic rule detects usage of recovery tools vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic and bcedit to delete backup files or change recovery configuration. Adversaries may use these tools to delete shadow copies and backup files to prevent recovery of files. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
Severity	High
Tactics	Impact
Techniques	T1490
Required data connectors	CiscoSecureEndpoint CrowdStrikeFalconEndpointProtection MicrosoftThreatProtection SentinelOne TrendMicroApexOne TrendMicroApexOneAma VMwareCarbonBlack
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Malware Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/BackupDeletionDetected.yaml
Version	1.0.0
Arm template	259de2c1-c546-4c6d-a17c-df639722f4d7.json

KQL

_ASim_ProcessEvent
| where TargetProcessFilename has_any ('vssadmin.exe', 'wbadmin.exe', 'wmic.exe')
| where CommandLine has_all ('delete', 'shadow')
| union isfuzzy=True 
    (_ASim_ProcessEvent
    | where TargetProcessFilename =~ 'bcedit.exe'
    | where CommandLine has_all ('/set', 'recoveryenabled no')
    )
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DvcHostname,
    DvcIpAddr,
    DvcDomain,
    TargetUsername,
    TargetUsernameType,
    TargetProcessName,
    TargetProcessId,
    CommandLine
| extend Username = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[1]), TargetUsername)
| extend NTDomain = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[0]), TargetUsername)
| extend Username = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '@')[0]), Username)
| extend UPNSuffix = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '@')[1]), '')

YAML

eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: DvcHostname
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: DvcDomain
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: NTDomain
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: DvcIpAddr
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: Username
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: UPNSuffix
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: NTDomain
- entityType: Process
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: ProcessId
    columnName: TargetProcessId
  - identifier: CommandLine
    columnName: CommandLine
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - CommonSecurityLog
  connectorId: CrowdStrikeFalconEndpointProtection
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityAlert
  connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
- dataTypes:
  - SentinelOne_CL
  connectorId: SentinelOne
- dataTypes:
  - CarbonBlackEvents_CL
  connectorId: VMwareCarbonBlack
- dataTypes:
  - CiscoSecureEndpoint_CL
  connectorId: CiscoSecureEndpoint
- dataTypes:
  - TMApexOneEvent
  connectorId: TrendMicroApexOne
- dataTypes:
  - TMApexOneEvent
  connectorId: TrendMicroApexOneAma
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Malware Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/BackupDeletionDetected.yaml
tags:
- Schema: _ASim_ProcessEvent
  SchemaVersion: 0.1.4
name: Detect Malicious Usage of Recovery Tools to Delete Backup Files
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Tool {{TargetProcessName}} used to delete backup files on {{DvcHostname}} by {{TargetUsername}}
  alertDescriptionFormat: 'A system tool {{TargetProcessName}} ProcessId: ({{TargetProcessId}}) with {{CommandLine}} used to delete backup files.'
relevantTechniques:
- T1490
status: Available
version: 1.0.0
queryPeriod: 1h
kind: Scheduled
id: 259de2c1-c546-4c6d-a17c-df639722f4d7
query: |
  _ASim_ProcessEvent
  | where TargetProcessFilename has_any ('vssadmin.exe', 'wbadmin.exe', 'wmic.exe')
  | where CommandLine has_all ('delete', 'shadow')
  | union isfuzzy=True 
      (_ASim_ProcessEvent
      | where TargetProcessFilename =~ 'bcedit.exe'
      | where CommandLine has_all ('/set', 'recoveryenabled no')
      )
  | project
      TimeGenerated,
      DvcHostname,
      DvcIpAddr,
      DvcDomain,
      TargetUsername,
      TargetUsernameType,
      TargetProcessName,
      TargetProcessId,
      CommandLine
  | extend Username = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[1]), TargetUsername)
  | extend NTDomain = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'Windows', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '\\')[0]), TargetUsername)
  | extend Username = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '@')[0]), Username)
  | extend UPNSuffix = iff(tostring(TargetUsernameType) == 'UPN', tostring(split(TargetUsername, '@')[1]), '')  
description: |
  This analytic rule detects usage of recovery tools vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic and bcedit to delete backup files or change recovery configuration. Adversaries may use these tools to delete shadow copies and backup files to prevent recovery of files.
  https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/  
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: High
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- Impact

ARM