Silk Typhoon Suspicious Exchange Request
Id | 23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151 |
Rulename | Silk Typhoon Suspicious Exchange Request |
Description | This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit a pattern observed by Silk Typhoon actors. The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | InitialAccess |
Techniques | T1190 |
Required data connectors | AzureMonitor(IIS) |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 14d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/SilkTyphoonSuspiciousExchangeRequestPattern.yaml |
Version | 1.0.3 |
Arm template | 23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151.json |
let exchange_servers = (
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where sSiteName =~ "Exchange Back End"
| summarize by Computer);
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where Computer in (exchange_servers)
| where csUriQuery startswith "t="
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Computer, csUriStem, csUriQuery, csUserName, csUserAgent, cIP
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[1])
relevantTechniques:
- T1190
name: Silk Typhoon Suspicious Exchange Request
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- W3CIISLog
connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS)
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: csUserName
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: cIP
entityType: IP
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151
tactics:
- InitialAccess
version: 1.0.3
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/SilkTyphoonSuspiciousExchangeRequestPattern.yaml
queryPeriod: 14d
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
categories:
domains:
- Security - Threat Intelligence
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
support:
tier: Community
source:
kind: Community
queryFrequency: 1d
severity: Medium
description: |
'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit a pattern observed by Silk Typhoon actors.
The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
query: |
let exchange_servers = (
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where sSiteName =~ "Exchange Back End"
| summarize by Computer);
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where Computer in (exchange_servers)
| where csUriQuery startswith "t="
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Computer, csUriStem, csUriQuery, csUserName, csUserAgent, cIP
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[1])
triggerOperator: gt
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit a pattern observed by Silk Typhoon actors.\nThe same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.\nReference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'\n",
"displayName": "Silk Typhoon Suspicious Exchange Request",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "csUserName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Computer",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostName",
"identifier": "HostName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostNameDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "cIP",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/SilkTyphoonSuspiciousExchangeRequestPattern.yaml",
"query": "let exchange_servers = (\nW3CIISLog\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)\n| where sSiteName =~ \"Exchange Back End\"\n| summarize by Computer);\nW3CIISLog\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| where Computer in (exchange_servers)\n| where csUriQuery startswith \"t=\"\n| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Computer, csUriStem, csUriQuery, csUserName, csUserAgent, cIP\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, \"@\")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, \"@\")[1])\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P14D",
"severity": "Medium",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"InitialAccess"
],
"techniques": [
"T1190"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.3",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}