Silk Typhoon Suspicious Exchange Request
| Id | 23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151 |
| Rulename | Silk Typhoon Suspicious Exchange Request |
| Description | This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit a pattern observed by Silk Typhoon actors. The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | InitialAccess |
| Techniques | T1190 |
| Required data connectors | AzureMonitor(IIS) |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1d |
| Query period | 14d |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/SilkTyphoonSuspiciousExchangeRequestPattern.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.3 |
| Arm template | 23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151.json |
let exchange_servers = (
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where sSiteName =~ "Exchange Back End"
| summarize by Computer);
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where Computer in (exchange_servers)
| where csUriQuery startswith "t="
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Computer, csUriStem, csUriQuery, csUserName, csUserAgent, cIP
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[1])
kind: Scheduled
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/SilkTyphoonSuspiciousExchangeRequestPattern.yaml
query: |
let exchange_servers = (
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where sSiteName =~ "Exchange Back End"
| summarize by Computer);
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where Computer in (exchange_servers)
| where csUriQuery startswith "t="
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Computer, csUriStem, csUriQuery, csUserName, csUserAgent, cIP
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[1])
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- W3CIISLog
connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS)
tactics:
- InitialAccess
name: Silk Typhoon Suspicious Exchange Request
metadata:
source:
kind: Community
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
support:
tier: Community
categories:
domains:
- Security - Threat Intelligence
relevantTechniques:
- T1190
severity: Medium
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: csUserName
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: cIP
entityType: IP
queryFrequency: 1d
description: |
'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit a pattern observed by Silk Typhoon actors.
The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
triggerThreshold: 0
triggerOperator: gt
version: 1.0.3
queryPeriod: 14d
id: 23005e87-2d3a-482b-b03d-edbebd1ae151