Suspicious linking of existing user to external User
Id | 22a320c2-e1e5-4c74-a35b-39fc9cdcf859 |
Rulename | Suspicious linking of existing user to external User |
Description | This query will detect when an attempt is made to update an existing user and link it to an guest or external identity. These activities are unusual and such linking of external identities should be investigated. In some cases you may see internal Entra ID sync accounts (Sync_) do this which may be benign |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | PrivilegeEscalation |
Techniques | T1078.004 |
Required data connectors | AzureActiveDirectory |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/SuspiciousLinkingofExternalIdtoExistingUsers.yaml |
Version | 1.1.0 |
Arm template | 22a320c2-e1e5-4c74-a35b-39fc9cdcf859.json |
AuditLogs
| where OperationName=~ "Update user"
| where Result =~ "success"
| mv-expand TargetResources
| mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties
| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName),
TargetUPN_oldValue = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.oldValue))[0]),
TargetUPN_newValue = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue))[0])
| where displayName == "UserPrincipalName" and TargetUPN_oldValue !has "#EXT" and TargetUPN_newValue has "#EXT"
| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName),InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName))
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by CorrelationId
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, InitiatingAppName, InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingIPAddress, TargetUPN_oldValue, TargetUPN_newValue
| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUPN_oldValue, "@")[0]), TargetUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUPN_oldValue, "@")[1])
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
name: Suspicious linking of existing user to external User
metadata:
support:
tier: Community
categories:
domains:
- Security - Others
- Identity
source:
kind: Community
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
queryPeriod: 1d
severity: Medium
tags:
- GuestorExternalIdentities
kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: InitiatingAppName
identifier: Name
- columnName: InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId
identifier: AadUserId
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
identifier: FullName
- columnName: InitiatingAccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
identifier: AadUserId
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: TargetUPN_oldValue
identifier: FullName
- columnName: TargetAccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: TargetUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: InitiatingIPAddress
identifier: Address
queryFrequency: 1d
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AuditLogs
connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/SuspiciousLinkingofExternalIdtoExistingUsers.yaml
description: |
' This query will detect when an attempt is made to update an existing user and link it to an guest or external identity. These activities are unusual and such linking of external
identities should be investigated. In some cases you may see internal Entra ID sync accounts (Sync_) do this which may be benign'
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
query: |
AuditLogs
| where OperationName=~ "Update user"
| where Result =~ "success"
| mv-expand TargetResources
| mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties
| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName),
TargetUPN_oldValue = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.oldValue))[0]),
TargetUPN_newValue = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue))[0])
| where displayName == "UserPrincipalName" and TargetUPN_oldValue !has "#EXT" and TargetUPN_newValue has "#EXT"
| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName),InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName))
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by CorrelationId
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, InitiatingAppName, InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingIPAddress, TargetUPN_oldValue, TargetUPN_newValue
| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUPN_oldValue, "@")[0]), TargetUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUPN_oldValue, "@")[1])
id: 22a320c2-e1e5-4c74-a35b-39fc9cdcf859
version: 1.1.0
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/22a320c2-e1e5-4c74-a35b-39fc9cdcf859')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/22a320c2-e1e5-4c74-a35b-39fc9cdcf859')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "22a320c2-e1e5-4c74-a35b-39fc9cdcf859",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "' This query will detect when an attempt is made to update an existing user and link it to an guest or external identity. These activities are unusual and such linking of external \nidentities should be investigated. In some cases you may see internal Entra ID sync accounts (Sync_) do this which may be benign'\n",
"displayName": "Suspicious linking of existing user to external User",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAppName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId",
"identifier": "AadUserId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingUserPrincipalName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAadUserId",
"identifier": "AadUserId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "TargetUPN_oldValue",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "TargetAccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "TargetUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingIPAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/SuspiciousLinkingofExternalIdtoExistingUsers.yaml",
"query": "AuditLogs\n| where OperationName=~ \"Update user\" \n| where Result =~ \"success\" \n| mv-expand TargetResources \n| mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties \n| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName), \nTargetUPN_oldValue = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.oldValue))[0]), \nTargetUPN_newValue = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue))[0])\n| where displayName == \"UserPrincipalName\" and TargetUPN_oldValue !has \"#EXT\" and TargetUPN_newValue has \"#EXT\"\n| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)\n| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)\n| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)\n| extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)\n| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName),InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName))\n| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by CorrelationId\n| project-reorder TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, InitiatingAppName, InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingIPAddress, TargetUPN_oldValue, TargetUPN_newValue\n| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[1])\n| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUPN_oldValue, \"@\")[0]), TargetUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUPN_oldValue, \"@\")[1])\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "Medium",
"subTechniques": [
"T1078.004"
],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"PrivilegeEscalation"
],
"tags": [
"GuestorExternalIdentities"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"templateVersion": "1.1.0",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}