AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious command sent to EC2

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Id	21702832-aff3-4bd6-a8e1-663b6818503d
Rulename	AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious command sent to EC2
Description	An attacker with the necessary AWS permissions could be executing code remotely on an EC2 instance via SSM and saving the output to their own S3 bucket. Verify this action with the user identity and confirm it was authorized.
Severity	High
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1651
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SuspiciousCommandEC2.yaml
Version	1.0.2
Arm template	21702832-aff3-4bd6-a8e1-663b6818503d.json

KQL

let command_executed = AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in ("SendCommand","CreateAssociation") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend params = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).parameters)
| extend s3bucketCommand = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).outputS3BucketName)
| extend s3bucketAssociation = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).outputLocation.s3Location.outputS3BucketName)
| where isnotempty(params)
| extend commandId = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).command.commandId)
| extend associationId = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).associationDescription.associationId)
| extend executionId = iff(isnotempty(commandId), commandId, associationId)
| extend s3bucket = iff(isnotempty(s3bucketCommand), s3bucketCommand, s3bucketAssociation)
| extend UserIdentityUserName = iff(isnotempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserIdentityUserName, tostring(split(UserIdentityArn,'/')[-1]));
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "PutObject" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend s3bucket = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).bucketName)
| mv-expand todynamic(Resources)
| extend accountId=tostring(todynamic(Resources.['accountId']))
| where Resources contains "accountId" and accountId <> RecipientAccountId
| join command_executed on s3bucket
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

YAML

status: Available
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
query: |
  let command_executed = AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in ("SendCommand","CreateAssociation") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend params = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).parameters)
  | extend s3bucketCommand = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).outputS3BucketName)
  | extend s3bucketAssociation = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).outputLocation.s3Location.outputS3BucketName)
  | where isnotempty(params)
  | extend commandId = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).command.commandId)
  | extend associationId = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).associationDescription.associationId)
  | extend executionId = iff(isnotempty(commandId), commandId, associationId)
  | extend s3bucket = iff(isnotempty(s3bucketCommand), s3bucketCommand, s3bucketAssociation)
  | extend UserIdentityUserName = iff(isnotempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserIdentityUserName, tostring(split(UserIdentityArn,'/')[-1]));
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName == "PutObject" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend s3bucket = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).bucketName)
  | mv-expand todynamic(Resources)
  | extend accountId=tostring(todynamic(Resources.['accountId']))
  | where Resources contains "accountId" and accountId <> RecipientAccountId
  | join command_executed on s3bucket
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")  
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SuspiciousCommandEC2.yaml
tactics:
- Execution
triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: User {{AccountName}} sent a remote command to EC2 (execution ID {{executionId}}) with output directed to external S3 bucket {{s3bucket}}.
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Suspicious EC2 command execution by {{AccountName}} with output to S3 {{s3bucket}}
relevantTechniques:
- T1651
customDetails:
  S3Bucket: s3bucket
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
  ExecutionId: executionId
description: |
    An attacker with the necessary AWS permissions could be executing code remotely on an EC2 instance via SSM and saving the output to their own S3 bucket. Verify this action with the user identity and confirm it was authorized.
name: AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious command sent to EC2
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled
id: 21702832-aff3-4bd6-a8e1-663b6818503d
severity: High

ARM