dsp_parser
| where EventID == 9212
| where SecurityIndicatorName == "Evidence of Mimikatz DCShadow attack"
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
relevantTechniques:
- T1207
queryFrequency: 1h
description: |
'Mimikatz's DCShadow switch allows a user who has compromised an AD domain, to inject arbitrary changes into AD using a "fake" domain controller. These changes bypass the security event log and can't be spotted using normal AD tools. This rule looks for evidence that a machine has been used in this capacity.'
severity: High
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: DnsDomain
entityType: Host
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- dsp_parser
connectorId: SemperisDSP
queryPeriod: 1h
id: 1a6d0a49-64b3-4ca1-96c3-f154c16c218c
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Semperis Directory Services Protector/Analytic Rules/SemperisDSP_EvidenceOfMimikatzDCShadowAttack.yaml
query: |
dsp_parser
| where EventID == 9212
| where SecurityIndicatorName == "Evidence of Mimikatz DCShadow attack"
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, '.', 0)[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
name: Semperis DSP Mimikatz's DCShadow Alert
version: 2.0.7
kind: Scheduled
status: Available