Windows Binaries Executed from Non-Default Directory

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Id	15049017-527f-4d3b-b011-b0e99e68ef45
Rulename	Windows Binaries Executed from Non-Default Directory
Description	The query detects Windows binaries, that can be executed from a non-default directory (e.g. C:\Windows\, C:\Windows\System32 etc.). Ref: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1059
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/WindowsBinariesExecutedfromNon-DefaultDirectory.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	15049017-527f-4d3b-b011-b0e99e68ef45.json

KQL

let procList = externaldata(Process:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Microsoft_Lolbas_Execution_Binaries.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688 and Process has_any (procList) and not (NewProcessName has ("C:\\Windows\\"))
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, SubjectUserName, NewProcessName, Process, CommandLine
| extend Name=tostring(split(SubjectUserName, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(SubjectUserName, "@")[1])
| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')

YAML

relevantTechniques:
- T1059
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 1.0.4
triggerOperator: gt
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
name: Windows Binaries Executed from Non-Default Directory
query: |
  let procList = externaldata(Process:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Microsoft_Lolbas_Execution_Binaries.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4688 and Process has_any (procList) and not (NewProcessName has ("C:\\Windows\\"))
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, SubjectUserName, NewProcessName, Process, CommandLine
  | extend Name=tostring(split(SubjectUserName, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(SubjectUserName, "@")[1])
  | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')  
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
status: Available
description: |
  'The query detects Windows binaries, that can be executed from a non-default directory (e.g. C:\Windows\, C:\Windows\System32 etc.). 
  Ref: https://lolbas-project.github.io/'  
queryFrequency: 1h
tactics:
- Execution
queryPeriod: 1h
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/WindowsBinariesExecutedfromNon-DefaultDirectory.yaml
id: 15049017-527f-4d3b-b011-b0e99e68ef45
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: Name
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: CommandLine
    columnName: CommandLine
  entityType: Process

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/15049017-527f-4d3b-b011-b0e99e68ef45')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/15049017-527f-4d3b-b011-b0e99e68ef45')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "15049017-527f-4d3b-b011-b0e99e68ef45",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'The query detects Windows binaries, that can be executed from a non-default directory (e.g. C:\\Windows\\, C:\\Windows\\System32 etc.). \nRef: https://lolbas-project.github.io/'\n",
        "displayName": "Windows Binaries Executed from Non-Default Directory",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Name",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "UPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "DnsDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Process",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "CommandLine",
                "identifier": "CommandLine"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/WindowsBinariesExecutedfromNon-DefaultDirectory.yaml",
        "query": "let procList = externaldata(Process:string) [@\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Microsoft_Lolbas_Execution_Binaries.csv\"] with (format=\"csv\", ignoreFirstRecord=True);\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4688 and Process has_any (procList) and not (NewProcessName has (\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\\"))\n| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, SubjectUserName, NewProcessName, Process, CommandLine\n| extend Name=tostring(split(SubjectUserName, \"@\")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(SubjectUserName, \"@\")[1])\n| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1059"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.4",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}