Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
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Privilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy

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Id139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf
RulenamePrivilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy
DescriptionDetected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on AdministratorAccess managed policy. Attackers could use these events for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.
SeverityMedium
TacticsPrivilegeEscalation
TechniquesT1484
Required data connectorsAWS
KindScheduled
Query frequency1d
Query period1d
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationAdministratorAccessManagedPolicy.yaml
Version1.0.1
Arm template139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf.json
Deploy To Azure
AWSCloudTrail
| where  EventName in ("AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) startswith "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, UserIdentityArn, ResponseElements, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
status: Available
description: |
    'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on AdministratorAccess managed policy. Attackers could use these events for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationAdministratorAccessManagedPolicy.yaml
version: 1.0.1
triggerThreshold: 0
kind: Scheduled
queryPeriod: 1d
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
triggerOperator: gt
id: 139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf
name: Privilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where  EventName in ("AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) startswith "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, UserIdentityArn, ResponseElements, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
queryFrequency: 1d
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
severity: Medium
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on AdministratorAccess managed policy. Attackers could use these events for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'\n",
        "displayName": "Privilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationAdministratorAccessManagedPolicy.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where  EventName in (\"AttachUserPolicy\",\"AttachRolePolicy\",\"AttachGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) startswith \"arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess\"\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, UserIdentityArn, ResponseElements, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}