Privilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy

AWSCloudTrail
| where  EventName in ("AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) startswith "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, UserIdentityArn, ResponseElements, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

name: Privilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
kind: Scheduled
description: |
    'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on AdministratorAccess managed policy. Attackers could use these events for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationAdministratorAccessManagedPolicy.yaml
version: 1.0.1
triggerThreshold: 0
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
severity: Medium
queryPeriod: 1d
status: Available
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where  EventName in ("AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) startswith "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, UserIdentityArn, ResponseElements, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
id: 139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "139e7116-3884-4246-9978-c8f740770bdf",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on AdministratorAccess managed policy. Attackers could use these events for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'\n",
        "displayName": "Privilege escalation with AdministratorAccess managed policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationAdministratorAccessManagedPolicy.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where  EventName in (\"AttachUserPolicy\",\"AttachRolePolicy\",\"AttachGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn) startswith \"arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess\"\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventTypeName, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource, AdditionalEventData, RequestParameters, UserIdentityArn, ResponseElements, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}