Detecting Impossible travel with mailbox permission tampering Privilege Escalation attempt

SecurityAlert 
| where AlertName == "Impossible travel activity"
| extend Extprop = parsejson(Entities)
| mv-expand Extprop
| extend Extprop = parsejson(Extprop)
| extend CmdLine = iff(Extprop['Type']=="process", Extprop['CommandLine'], '')
| extend File = iff(Extprop['Type']=="file", Extprop['Name'], '')
| extend Account = Extprop['Name']
| extend Domain = Extprop['UPNSuffix']
| extend Account = iif(isnotempty(Domain) and Extprop['Type']=="account", tolower(strcat(Account, "@", Domain)), iif(Extprop['Type']=="account", tolower(Account), ""))
| extend IpAddress = iff(Extprop["Type"] == "ip",Extprop['Address'], '')
| extend Process = iff(isnotempty(CmdLine), CmdLine, File)
| project TimeGenerated,Account,IpAddress,CompromisedEntity,Description,ProviderName,ResourceId
| join kind=inner
(
OfficeActivity
| where Operation =~ "Add-MailboxPermission"
| extend value = tostring(parse_json(Parameters)[3].Value)
| where value contains "FullAccess"
| where ResultStatus == "True"
| project Parameters,TimeGenerated,value,RecordType,Operation,OrganizationId,UserType,UserKey,OfficeWorkload,ResultStatus,OfficeObjectId,UserId,ClientIP,ExternalAccess,OriginatingServer,OrganizationName,TenantId,ElevationTime,SourceSystem,OfficeId,OfficeTenantId,Type,SourceRecordId
) on $left.Account == $right.UserId
| join kind=inner
(
AuditLogs
| where ActivityDisplayName =~ "Add eligible member to role in PIM requested (timebound)"
| where AADOperationType =~ "CreateRequestEligibleRole"
| where TargetResources has_any ("-PRIV", "Administrator", "Security")
| extend BuiltinRole = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[0].displayName))
| extend CustomGroup = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[3].displayName))
| extend TargetAccount = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[2].displayName))
| extend Initiatedby = Identity
| project TimeGenerated, ActivityDisplayName, AADOperationType, Initiatedby, TargetAccount, BuiltinRole, CustomGroup, LoggedByService, Result, ResourceId, Id
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
) on $left.UserId == $right.Initiatedby
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Initiatedby, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiatedby, "@")[1])
| project AADOperationType, ActivityDisplayName,AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, Id,ResourceId,IpAddress

severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureSecurityCenter
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityAlert (ASC)
- connectorId: Office365
  dataTypes:
  - OfficeActivity
- connectorId: AzureActivity
  dataTypes:
  - AzureActivity
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
  dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
kind: Scheduled
id: 1399664f-9434-497c-9cde-42e4d74ae20e
tactics:
- InitialAccess
- PrivilegeEscalation
queryFrequency: 1d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/MailBoxTampering.yaml
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Initiatedby
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IpAddress
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
- T1548
version: 1.0.2
queryPeriod: 1d
name: Detecting Impossible travel with mailbox permission tampering & Privilege Escalation attempt
metadata:
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  source:
    kind: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
    - Identity
  support:
    tier: Community
triggerOperator: gt
description: |
  'This hunting query will alert on any Impossible travel activity in correlation with mailbox permission tampering followed by account being added to a PIM managed privileged group.
  Ensure this impossible travel incident with increase of privileges is legitimate in your environment.'  
query: |
  SecurityAlert 
  | where AlertName == "Impossible travel activity"
  | extend Extprop = parsejson(Entities)
  | mv-expand Extprop
  | extend Extprop = parsejson(Extprop)
  | extend CmdLine = iff(Extprop['Type']=="process", Extprop['CommandLine'], '')
  | extend File = iff(Extprop['Type']=="file", Extprop['Name'], '')
  | extend Account = Extprop['Name']
  | extend Domain = Extprop['UPNSuffix']
  | extend Account = iif(isnotempty(Domain) and Extprop['Type']=="account", tolower(strcat(Account, "@", Domain)), iif(Extprop['Type']=="account", tolower(Account), ""))
  | extend IpAddress = iff(Extprop["Type"] == "ip",Extprop['Address'], '')
  | extend Process = iff(isnotempty(CmdLine), CmdLine, File)
  | project TimeGenerated,Account,IpAddress,CompromisedEntity,Description,ProviderName,ResourceId
  | join kind=inner
  (
  OfficeActivity
  | where Operation =~ "Add-MailboxPermission"
  | extend value = tostring(parse_json(Parameters)[3].Value)
  | where value contains "FullAccess"
  | where ResultStatus == "True"
  | project Parameters,TimeGenerated,value,RecordType,Operation,OrganizationId,UserType,UserKey,OfficeWorkload,ResultStatus,OfficeObjectId,UserId,ClientIP,ExternalAccess,OriginatingServer,OrganizationName,TenantId,ElevationTime,SourceSystem,OfficeId,OfficeTenantId,Type,SourceRecordId
  ) on $left.Account == $right.UserId
  | join kind=inner
  (
  AuditLogs
  | where ActivityDisplayName =~ "Add eligible member to role in PIM requested (timebound)"
  | where AADOperationType =~ "CreateRequestEligibleRole"
  | where TargetResources has_any ("-PRIV", "Administrator", "Security")
  | extend BuiltinRole = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[0].displayName))
  | extend CustomGroup = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[3].displayName))
  | extend TargetAccount = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[2].displayName))
  | extend Initiatedby = Identity
  | project TimeGenerated, ActivityDisplayName, AADOperationType, Initiatedby, TargetAccount, BuiltinRole, CustomGroup, LoggedByService, Result, ResourceId, Id
  | sort by TimeGenerated desc
  ) on $left.UserId == $right.Initiatedby
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Initiatedby, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiatedby, "@")[1])
  | project AADOperationType, ActivityDisplayName,AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, Id,ResourceId,IpAddress  

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/1399664f-9434-497c-9cde-42e4d74ae20e')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/1399664f-9434-497c-9cde-42e4d74ae20e')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "1399664f-9434-497c-9cde-42e4d74ae20e",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This hunting query will alert on any Impossible travel activity in correlation with mailbox permission tampering followed by account being added to a PIM managed privileged group.\nEnsure this impossible travel incident with increase of privileges is legitimate in your environment.'\n",
        "displayName": "Detecting Impossible travel with mailbox permission tampering & Privilege Escalation attempt",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Initiatedby",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/MailBoxTampering.yaml",
        "query": "SecurityAlert \n| where AlertName == \"Impossible travel activity\"\n| extend Extprop = parsejson(Entities)\n| mv-expand Extprop\n| extend Extprop = parsejson(Extprop)\n| extend CmdLine = iff(Extprop['Type']==\"process\", Extprop['CommandLine'], '')\n| extend File = iff(Extprop['Type']==\"file\", Extprop['Name'], '')\n| extend Account = Extprop['Name']\n| extend Domain = Extprop['UPNSuffix']\n| extend Account = iif(isnotempty(Domain) and Extprop['Type']==\"account\", tolower(strcat(Account, \"@\", Domain)), iif(Extprop['Type']==\"account\", tolower(Account), \"\"))\n| extend IpAddress = iff(Extprop[\"Type\"] == \"ip\",Extprop['Address'], '')\n| extend Process = iff(isnotempty(CmdLine), CmdLine, File)\n| project TimeGenerated,Account,IpAddress,CompromisedEntity,Description,ProviderName,ResourceId\n| join kind=inner\n(\nOfficeActivity\n| where Operation =~ \"Add-MailboxPermission\"\n| extend value = tostring(parse_json(Parameters)[3].Value)\n| where value contains \"FullAccess\"\n| where ResultStatus == \"True\"\n| project Parameters,TimeGenerated,value,RecordType,Operation,OrganizationId,UserType,UserKey,OfficeWorkload,ResultStatus,OfficeObjectId,UserId,ClientIP,ExternalAccess,OriginatingServer,OrganizationName,TenantId,ElevationTime,SourceSystem,OfficeId,OfficeTenantId,Type,SourceRecordId\n) on $left.Account == $right.UserId\n| join kind=inner\n(\nAuditLogs\n| where ActivityDisplayName =~ \"Add eligible member to role in PIM requested (timebound)\"\n| where AADOperationType =~ \"CreateRequestEligibleRole\"\n| where TargetResources has_any (\"-PRIV\", \"Administrator\", \"Security\")\n| extend BuiltinRole = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[0].displayName))\n| extend CustomGroup = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[3].displayName))\n| extend TargetAccount = tostring(parse_json(TargetResources[2].displayName))\n| extend Initiatedby = Identity\n| project TimeGenerated, ActivityDisplayName, AADOperationType, Initiatedby, TargetAccount, BuiltinRole, CustomGroup, LoggedByService, Result, ResourceId, Id\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n) on $left.UserId == $right.Initiatedby\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Initiatedby, \"@\")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Initiatedby, \"@\")[1])\n| project AADOperationType, ActivityDisplayName,AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, Id,ResourceId,IpAddress\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "InitialAccess",
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078",
          "T1548"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}