Analytic rule catalog
Solorigate Named Pipe
Back
| Id | 11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee |
| Rulename | Solorigate Named Pipe |
| Description | Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident. For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18) Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095 |
| Severity | High |
| Tactics | DefenseEvasion PrivilegeEscalation |
| Techniques | T1055 |
| Required data connectors | SecurityEvents WindowsForwardedEvents WindowsSecurityEvents |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1d |
| Query period | 1d |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/SolorigateNamedPipe.yaml |
| Version | 1.2.5 |
| Arm template | 11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee.json |
(union isfuzzy=true
(Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID in (17,18)
| where EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
| extend PipeName = column_ifexists("PipeName", "")
| extend Account = User
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @"\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @"\")[0])
),
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == '5145'
// %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
| where AccessList has '%%4418'
| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountNTDomain = SubjectDomainName
),
(
WindowsEvent
| where EventID == '5145' and EventData has '%%4418' and EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
// %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
| extend AccessList= tostring(EventData.AccessList)
| where AccessList has '%%4418'
| extend RelativeTargetName= tostring(EventData.RelativeTargetName)
| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend Account = strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountNTDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
tags:
- Solorigate
- NOBELIUM
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- WindowsEvent
connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
queryPeriod: 1d
kind: Scheduled
severity: High
metadata:
categories:
domains:
- Security - 0-day Vulnerability
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
support:
tier: Community
source:
kind: Community
queryFrequency: 1d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/SolorigateNamedPipe.yaml
triggerThreshold: 0
description: |
'Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident.
For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18)
Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095'
id: 11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee
triggerOperator: gt
relevantTechniques:
- T1055
version: 1.2.5
name: Solorigate Named Pipe
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: Account
identifier: FullName
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountNTDomain
identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- columnName: Computer
identifier: FullName
- columnName: HostName
identifier: HostName
- columnName: HostNameDomain
identifier: NTDomain
query: |
(union isfuzzy=true
(Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID in (17,18)
| where EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
| extend PipeName = column_ifexists("PipeName", "")
| extend Account = User
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @"\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @"\")[0])
),
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == '5145'
// %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
| where AccessList has '%%4418'
| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountNTDomain = SubjectDomainName
),
(
WindowsEvent
| where EventID == '5145' and EventData has '%%4418' and EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
// %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
| extend AccessList= tostring(EventData.AccessList)
| where AccessList has '%%4418'
| extend RelativeTargetName= tostring(EventData.RelativeTargetName)
| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend Account = strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountNTDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident.\n For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18)\n Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095'\n",
"displayName": "Solorigate Named Pipe",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Account",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountNTDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Computer",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostName",
"identifier": "HostName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostNameDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/SolorigateNamedPipe.yaml",
"query": "(union isfuzzy=true\n(Event\n| where Source == \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n| where EventID in (17,18)\n| where EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'\n| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data\n| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData\n| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)\n| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', \"\")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', \"\")\n| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)\n| extend PipeName = column_ifexists(\"PipeName\", \"\")\n| extend Account = User\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @\"\\\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @\"\\\")[0])\n),\n(\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == '5145'\n// 4418'\n| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'\n| extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountNTDomain = SubjectDomainName\n),\n(\nWindowsEvent\n| where EventID == '5145' and EventData has '4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value\n| extend AccessList= tostring(EventData.AccessList)\n| where AccessList has '%%4418'\n| extend RelativeTargetName= tostring(EventData.RelativeTargetName)\n| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'\n| extend Account = strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),\"\\\\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))\n| extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountNTDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)\n)\n)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| project-away DomainIndex\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "High",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"DefenseEvasion",
"PrivilegeEscalation"
],
"tags": [
"Solorigate",
"NOBELIUM"
],
"techniques": [
"T1055"
],
"templateVersion": "1.2.5",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}