Solorigate Named Pipe

Back


Id	11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee
Rulename	Solorigate Named Pipe
Description	Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident. For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18) Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095
Severity	High
Tactics	DefenseEvasion PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1055
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsForwardedEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/SolorigateNamedPipe.yaml
Version	1.2.5
Arm template	11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee.json

KQL

(union isfuzzy=true
(Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID in (17,18)
| where EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
| extend PipeName = column_ifexists("PipeName", "")
| extend Account = User
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @"\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @"\")[0])
),
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == '5145'
// %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
| where AccessList has '%%4418'
| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountNTDomain = SubjectDomainName
),
(
WindowsEvent
| where EventID == '5145' and EventData has '%%4418'  and EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
// %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
| extend AccessList= tostring(EventData.AccessList)
| where AccessList has '%%4418'
| extend RelativeTargetName= tostring(EventData.RelativeTargetName)
| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountNTDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex

YAML

OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/SolorigateNamedPipe.yaml
query: |
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (Event
  | where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID in (17,18)
  | where EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
  | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
  | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
  | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
  | extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
  | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)
  | extend PipeName = column_ifexists("PipeName", "")
  | extend Account = User
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @"\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @"\")[0])
  ),
  (
  SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == '5145'
  // %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
  | where AccessList has '%%4418'
  | where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
  | extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountNTDomain = SubjectDomainName
  ),
  (
  WindowsEvent
  | where EventID == '5145' and EventData has '%%4418'  and EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
  // %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value
  | extend AccessList= tostring(EventData.AccessList)
  | where AccessList has '%%4418'
  | extend RelativeTargetName= tostring(EventData.RelativeTargetName)
  | where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'
  | extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
  | extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountNTDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
  )
  )
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | project-away DomainIndex  
description: |
  'Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident.
   For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18)
   Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095'  
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - WindowsEvent
  connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
tags:
- Solorigate
- NOBELIUM
triggerThreshold: 0
metadata:
  source:
    kind: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - 0-day Vulnerability
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  support:
    tier: Community
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Account
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountNTDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Computer
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
version: 1.2.5
relevantTechniques:
- T1055
triggerOperator: gt
name: Solorigate Named Pipe
id: 11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "11b4c19d-2a79-4da3-af38-b067e1273dee",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Identifies a match across various data feeds for named pipe IOCs related to the Solorigate incident.\n For the sysmon events required for this detection, logging for Named Pipe Events needs to be configured in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18)\n Reference: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/solarwinds-post-compromise-hunting-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/1995095'\n",
        "displayName": "Solorigate Named Pipe",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Account",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountNTDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/SolorigateNamedPipe.yaml",
        "query": "(union isfuzzy=true\n(Event\n| where Source == \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n| where EventID in (17,18)\n| where EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'\n| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data\n| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData\n| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)\n| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', \"\")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', \"\")\n| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, MG, ManagementGroupName, _ResourceId)\n| extend PipeName = column_ifexists(\"PipeName\", \"\")\n| extend Account = User\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, @\"\\\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, @\"\\\")[0])\n),\n(\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == '5145'\n// %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value\n| where AccessList has '%%4418'\n| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'\n| extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountNTDomain = SubjectDomainName\n),\n(\nWindowsEvent\n| where EventID == '5145' and EventData has '%%4418'  and EventData has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'\n// %%4418 looks for presence of CreatePipeInstance value\n| extend AccessList= tostring(EventData.AccessList)\n| where AccessList has '%%4418'\n| extend RelativeTargetName= tostring(EventData.RelativeTargetName)\n| where RelativeTargetName has '583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'\n| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),\"\\\\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))\n| extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountNTDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)\n)\n)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| project-away DomainIndex\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion",
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "Solorigate",
          "NOBELIUM"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1055"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.2.5",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}