let threshold = 2.5;
let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
let min_t = ago(14d);
let max_t = now();
let timeframe = 1d;
let DNSEvents=(stime: datetime, etime: datetime) {
_Im_Dns(starttime=stime, endtime=etime, domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
};
DNSEvents(stime=min_t, etime=max_t)
| make-series QueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) on TimeGenerated from min_t to max_t step timeframe by SrcIpAddr
| extend (anomalies, score, baseline) = series_decompose_anomalies(QueryCount, threshold, -1, 'linefit')
| mv-expand anomalies, score, baseline, TimeGenerated, QueryCount
| extend
anomalies = toint(anomalies),
score = toint(score),
baseline = toint(baseline),
EventTime = todatetime(TimeGenerated),
Total = tolong(QueryCount)
| where EventTime >= ago(timeframe)
| where score >= threshold * 2
| join kind = inner (DNSEvents(stime=ago(timeframe), etime=max_t)
| summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
on SrcIpAddr
| project-away SrcIpAddr1
tags:
- SchemaVersion: 0.1.6
Schema: ASimDns
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- Reconnaissance
eventGroupingSettings:
aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/DNS Essentials/Analytic Rules/RareClientObservedWithHighReverseDNSLookupCountAnomalyBased.yaml
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDescriptionFormat: |-
Client has been identified as making high reverse DNS counts which could be carrying out reconnaissance or discovery activity.
Reverse DNS lookup count baseline for this client: '{{baseline}}'
Current reverse DNS lookup count by this client showing as: '{{Total}}'
DNS queries requested by this client inlcude: '{{DNSQueries}}'
alertDisplayNameFormat: "[Anomaly] Rare client has been observed as making high reverse DNS lookup count - client IP: '{{SrcIpAddr}}'"
version: 1.0.2
query: |
let threshold = 2.5;
let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
let min_t = ago(14d);
let max_t = now();
let timeframe = 1d;
let DNSEvents=(stime: datetime, etime: datetime) {
_Im_Dns(starttime=stime, endtime=etime, domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
};
DNSEvents(stime=min_t, etime=max_t)
| make-series QueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) on TimeGenerated from min_t to max_t step timeframe by SrcIpAddr
| extend (anomalies, score, baseline) = series_decompose_anomalies(QueryCount, threshold, -1, 'linefit')
| mv-expand anomalies, score, baseline, TimeGenerated, QueryCount
| extend
anomalies = toint(anomalies),
score = toint(score),
baseline = toint(baseline),
EventTime = todatetime(TimeGenerated),
Total = tolong(QueryCount)
| where EventTime >= ago(timeframe)
| where score >= threshold * 2
| join kind = inner (DNSEvents(stime=ago(timeframe), etime=max_t)
| summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
on SrcIpAddr
| project-away SrcIpAddr1
triggerThreshold: 0
relevantTechniques:
- T1590
queryPeriod: 14d
status: Available
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
customDetails:
baseline: baseline
Total: Total
DNSQueries: DNSQueries
AnomalyScore: score
name: Rare client observed with high reverse DNS lookup count - Anomaly based (ASIM DNS Solution)
queryFrequency: 1d
id: 0fe6bde4-b215-480c-99b4-84a96edcdbd7
description: |
'This rule makes use of the series decompose anomaly method to identify clients with high reverse DNS counts. This helps in detecting the possible initial phases of an attack, like discovery and reconnaissance. It utilizes [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) normalization and is applied to any source that supports the ASIM DNS schema.'
requiredDataConnectors: []
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: SrcIpAddr
identifier: Address
entityType: IP