let threshold = 2.5;
let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
let min_t = ago(14d);
let max_t = now();
let timeframe = 1d;
let DNSEvents=(stime: datetime, etime: datetime) {
_Im_Dns(starttime=stime, endtime=etime, domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
};
DNSEvents(stime=min_t, etime=max_t)
| make-series QueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) on TimeGenerated from min_t to max_t step timeframe by SrcIpAddr
| extend (anomalies, score, baseline) = series_decompose_anomalies(QueryCount, threshold, -1, 'linefit')
| mv-expand anomalies, score, baseline, TimeGenerated, QueryCount
| extend
anomalies = toint(anomalies),
score = toint(score),
baseline = toint(baseline),
EventTime = todatetime(TimeGenerated),
Total = tolong(QueryCount)
| where EventTime >= ago(timeframe)
| where score >= threshold * 2
| join kind = inner (DNSEvents(stime=ago(timeframe), etime=max_t)
| summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
on SrcIpAddr
| project-away SrcIpAddr1
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDescriptionFormat: |-
Client has been identified as making high reverse DNS counts which could be carrying out reconnaissance or discovery activity.
Reverse DNS lookup count baseline for this client: '{{baseline}}'
Current reverse DNS lookup count by this client showing as: '{{Total}}'
DNS queries requested by this client inlcude: '{{DNSQueries}}'
alertDisplayNameFormat: "[Anomaly] Rare client has been observed as making high reverse DNS lookup count - client IP: '{{SrcIpAddr}}'"
relevantTechniques:
- T1590
name: Rare client observed with high reverse DNS lookup count - Anomaly based (ASIM DNS Solution)
queryFrequency: 1d
version: 1.0.2
triggerThreshold: 0
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors: []
tactics:
- Reconnaissance
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/DNS Essentials/Analytic Rules/RareClientObservedWithHighReverseDNSLookupCountAnomalyBased.yaml
query: |
let threshold = 2.5;
let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
let min_t = ago(14d);
let max_t = now();
let timeframe = 1d;
let DNSEvents=(stime: datetime, etime: datetime) {
_Im_Dns(starttime=stime, endtime=etime, domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
};
DNSEvents(stime=min_t, etime=max_t)
| make-series QueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) on TimeGenerated from min_t to max_t step timeframe by SrcIpAddr
| extend (anomalies, score, baseline) = series_decompose_anomalies(QueryCount, threshold, -1, 'linefit')
| mv-expand anomalies, score, baseline, TimeGenerated, QueryCount
| extend
anomalies = toint(anomalies),
score = toint(score),
baseline = toint(baseline),
EventTime = todatetime(TimeGenerated),
Total = tolong(QueryCount)
| where EventTime >= ago(timeframe)
| where score >= threshold * 2
| join kind = inner (DNSEvents(stime=ago(timeframe), etime=max_t)
| summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
on SrcIpAddr
| project-away SrcIpAddr1
kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: SrcIpAddr
identifier: Address
entityType: IP
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
customDetails:
AnomalyScore: score
baseline: baseline
DNSQueries: DNSQueries
Total: Total
eventGroupingSettings:
aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
id: 0fe6bde4-b215-480c-99b4-84a96edcdbd7
tags:
- Schema: ASimDns
SchemaVersion: 0.1.6
status: Available
description: |
'This rule makes use of the series decompose anomaly method to identify clients with high reverse DNS counts. This helps in detecting the possible initial phases of an attack, like discovery and reconnaissance. It utilizes [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) normalization and is applied to any source that supports the ASIM DNS schema.'