GitLab - User Impersonation
Id | 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40 |
Rulename | GitLab - User Impersonation |
Description | This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or repository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation. |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | Persistence |
Techniques | T1078 |
Required data connectors | Syslog |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1h |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml |
Version | 1.0.0 |
Arm template | 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40.json |
let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');
let impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');
impersonationStart
| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID
| where EventTime1 > EventTime
| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName
| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName
| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime
severity: Medium
queryFrequency: 1h
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
tactics:
- Persistence
kind: Scheduled
query: |
let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');
let impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');
impersonationStart
| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID
| where EventTime1 > EventTime
| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName
| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName
| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml
queryPeriod: 1d
status: Available
version: 1.0.0
name: GitLab - User Impersonation
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- Syslog
connectorId: Syslog
triggerOperator: gt
entityMappings:
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: IPStart
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: IPStop
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: EntityName
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: TargetDetails
id: 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40
description: |
'This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or
repository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation.'
triggerThreshold: 0
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40')]",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40')]",
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"apiVersion": "2022-11-01-preview",
"properties": {
"displayName": "GitLab - User Impersonation",
"description": "'This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or\nrepository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation.'\n",
"severity": "Medium",
"enabled": true,
"query": "let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit\n| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');\nlet impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit\n| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');\nimpersonationStart\n| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID \n| where EventTime1 > EventTime\n| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName\n| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName \n| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0,
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Persistence"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"alertRuleTemplateName": "0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40",
"customDetails": null,
"entityMappings": [
{
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPStart",
"identifier": "Address"
}
],
"entityType": "IP"
},
{
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPStop",
"identifier": "Address"
}
],
"entityType": "IP"
},
{
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "EntityName",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
],
"entityType": "Account"
},
{
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "TargetDetails",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
],
"entityType": "Account"
}
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.0",
"status": "Available",
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml"
}
}
]
}