GitLab - User Impersonation
Id | 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40 |
Rulename | GitLab - User Impersonation |
Description | This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or repository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation. |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | Persistence |
Techniques | T1078 |
Required data connectors | Syslog |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1h |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml |
Version | 1.0.0 |
Arm template | 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40.json |
let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');
let impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');
impersonationStart
| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID
| where EventTime1 > EventTime
| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName
| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName
| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime
queryFrequency: 1h
triggerThreshold: 0
name: GitLab - User Impersonation
version: 1.0.0
id: 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40
status: Available
tactics:
- Persistence
entityMappings:
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: IPStart
identifier: Address
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: IPStop
identifier: Address
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: EntityName
identifier: FullName
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: TargetDetails
identifier: FullName
queryPeriod: 1d
description: |
'This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or
repository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation.'
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: Syslog
dataTypes:
- Syslog
query: |
let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');
let impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');
impersonationStart
| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID
| where EventTime1 > EventTime
| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName
| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName
| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime
kind: Scheduled
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml
triggerOperator: gt
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
severity: Medium
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or\nrepository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation.'\n",
"displayName": "GitLab - User Impersonation",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPStart",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPStop",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "EntityName",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "TargetDetails",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml",
"query": "let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit\n| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');\nlet impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit\n| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');\nimpersonationStart\n| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID \n| where EventTime1 > EventTime\n| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName\n| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName \n| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Persistence"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.0",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}