NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA
Id | 0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b |
Rulename | NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA |
Description | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA. You can limit this detection to trigger for administrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts. This is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful. |
Severity | Low |
Tactics | DefenseEvasion PrivilegeEscalation Persistence InitialAccess |
Techniques | T1078 |
Required data connectors | AWS AWSS3 |
Kind | NRT |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/NRT_AWS_ConsoleLogonWithoutMFA.yaml |
Version | 1.0.2 |
Arm template | 0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b.json |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
| where MFAUsed !~ "Yes" and LoginResult !~ "Failure"
| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains "AWSReservedSSO"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/NRT_AWS_ConsoleLogonWithoutMFA.yaml
kind: NRT
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- columnName: RecipientAccountId
identifier: CloudAppAccountId
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: SourceIpAddress
identifier: Address
entityType: IP
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
connectorId: AWS
- dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
connectorId: AWSS3
status: Available
query: |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
| where MFAUsed !~ "Yes" and LoginResult !~ "Failure"
| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains "AWSReservedSSO"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
- InitialAccess
severity: Low
name: NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA
description: |
'Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA.
You can limit this detection to trigger for administrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts.
This is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used
and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful.'
version: 1.0.2
id: 0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b')]",
"kind": "NRT",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA.\nYou can limit this detection to trigger for administrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts.\nThis is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used\nand the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful.'\n",
"displayName": "NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
},
{
"columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
"identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/NRT_AWS_ConsoleLogonWithoutMFA.yaml",
"query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName =~ \"ConsoleLogin\"\n| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)\n| where MFAUsed !~ \"Yes\" and LoginResult !~ \"Failure\"\n| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains \"AWSReservedSSO\"\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,\n UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion\n",
"severity": "Low",
"status": "Available",
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"DefenseEvasion",
"InitialAccess",
"Persistence",
"PrivilegeEscalation"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.2"
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}