NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
| where MFAUsed !~ "Yes" and LoginResult !~ "Failure"
| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains "AWSReservedSSO"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId,  UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
  UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion

version: 1.0.3
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/NRT_AWS_ConsoleLogonWithoutMFA.yaml
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
  | extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
  | where MFAUsed !~ "Yes" and LoginResult !~ "Failure"
  | where SessionIssuerUserName !contains "AWSReservedSSO"
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId,  UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
    UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion  
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
- connectorId: AWSS3
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
description: |
  'Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA.
  You can limit this detection to trigger for administrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts.
  This is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful.'  
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
- InitialAccess
status: Available
kind: NRT
name: NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA
severity: Low
id: 0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
  entityType: IP

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b')]",
      "kind": "NRT",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA.\nYou can limit this detection to trigger for administrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts.\nThis is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful.'\n",
        "displayName": "NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/NRT_AWS_ConsoleLogonWithoutMFA.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName =~ \"ConsoleLogin\"\n| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)\n| where MFAUsed !~ \"Yes\" and LoginResult !~ \"Failure\"\n| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains \"AWSReservedSSO\"\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId,  UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,\n  UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion\n",
        "severity": "Low",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion",
          "InitialAccess",
          "Persistence",
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.3"
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}