S3 object publicly exposed
Id | 09f2a28b-3286-4268-9e2f-33805f104e5d |
Rulename | S3 object publicly exposed |
Description | Detected S3 bucket that’s publicly exposed, which could lead to sensitive information leakage to the public. Verify the S3 object configurations. |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | Exfiltration |
Techniques | T1537 |
Required data connectors | AWS |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1h |
Query period | 1h |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_S3ObjectPubliclyExposed.yaml |
Version | 1.0.1 |
Arm template | 09f2a28b-3286-4268-9e2f-33805f104e5d.json |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "PutObjectAcl" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant
| mvexpand Grant
| extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))
| extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.["xsi:type"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).["x-amz-acl"]
| where (type == "Group" and (URI endswith "AllUsers" or URI endswith "AuthenticatedUsers"))
or xamzacl in ("authenticated-read","public-read","public-read-write")
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
relevantTechniques:
- T1537
name: S3 object publicly exposed
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
connectorId: AWS
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
entityType: IP
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 09f2a28b-3286-4268-9e2f-33805f104e5d
tactics:
- Exfiltration
version: 1.0.1
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_S3ObjectPubliclyExposed.yaml
queryPeriod: 1h
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: Medium
status: Available
description: |
'Detected S3 bucket that's publicly exposed, which could lead to sensitive information leakage to the public. Verify the S3 object configurations.'
query: |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "PutObjectAcl" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant
| mvexpand Grant
| extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))
| extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.["xsi:type"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).["x-amz-acl"]
| where (type == "Group" and (URI endswith "AllUsers" or URI endswith "AuthenticatedUsers"))
or xamzacl in ("authenticated-read","public-read","public-read-write")
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
triggerOperator: gt
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/09f2a28b-3286-4268-9e2f-33805f104e5d')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/09f2a28b-3286-4268-9e2f-33805f104e5d')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "09f2a28b-3286-4268-9e2f-33805f104e5d",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'Detected S3 bucket that's publicly exposed, which could lead to sensitive information leakage to the public. Verify the S3 object configurations.'\n",
"displayName": "S3 object publicly exposed",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
},
{
"columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
"identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_S3ObjectPubliclyExposed.yaml",
"query": "AWSCloudTrail\n | where EventName == \"PutObjectAcl\" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n | extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant\n | mvexpand Grant\n | extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))\n | extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.[\"xsi:type\"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).[\"x-amz-acl\"]\n | where (type == \"Group\" and (URI endswith \"AllUsers\" or URI endswith \"AuthenticatedUsers\"))\n or xamzacl in (\"authenticated-read\",\"public-read\",\"public-read-write\")\n | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Exfiltration"
],
"techniques": [
"T1537"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.1",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}