AWSCloudTrail - Config Service Resource Deletion Attempts
| Id | 093fe75e-44f1-4d3e-94dc-6d258a6dd2d2 |
| Rulename | AWSCloudTrail - Config Service Resource Deletion Attempts |
| Description | Identifies AWS API calls that attempt to reduce logging or visibility in an account by stopping logging, deleting trails, deleting flow logs, or deleting event buses. This behavior can indicate defense evasion or the deliberate suppression of telemetry used to monitor security posture. |
| Severity | Low |
| Tactics | DefenseEvasion |
| Techniques | T1562.008 |
| Required data connectors | AWS AWSS3 |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1d |
| Query period | 1d |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ConfigServiceResourceDeletion.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.1 |
| Arm template | 093fe75e-44f1-4d3e-94dc-6d258a6dd2d2.json |
let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in~ (EventNameList)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ConfigServiceResourceDeletion.yaml
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS Config Service Resource Deletion Attempts: {{EventName}} by {{AccountName}}'
alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} in {{AWSRegion}} affecting account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
id: 093fe75e-44f1-4d3e-94dc-6d258a6dd2d2
name: AWSCloudTrail - Config Service Resource Deletion Attempts
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
entityType: IP
kind: Scheduled
severity: Low
customDetails:
EventTypeName: EventTypeName
EventSource: EventSource
EventName: EventName
AWSRegion: AWSRegion
status: Available
relevantTechniques:
- T1562.008
description: |
Identifies AWS API calls that attempt to reduce logging or visibility in an account by stopping logging, deleting trails, deleting flow logs, or deleting event buses. This behavior can indicate defense evasion or the deliberate suppression of telemetry used to monitor security posture.
triggerThreshold: 0
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
- connectorId: AWSS3
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
query: |
let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in~ (EventNameList)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
version: 1.0.1