AWS Config Service Resource Deletion Attempts

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Id	093fe75e-44f1-4d3e-94dc-6d258a6dd2d2
Rulename	AWS Config Service Resource Deletion Attempts
Description	Detects attempts to remove a part of the AWS Config Service.The Threat Actor may manipulate the Config services decrease the visibility into the security posture of an account and / or its workload instances.
Severity	Low
Tactics	DefenseEvasion
Techniques	T1562 T1562.001
Required data connectors	AWS AWSS3
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ConfigServiceResourceDeletion.yaml
Version	1.0.0
Arm template	093fe75e-44f1-4d3e-94dc-6d258a6dd2d2.json

KQL

let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in~ (EventNameList)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc

YAML

name: AWS Config Service Resource Deletion Attempts
relevantTechniques:
- T1562
- T1562.001
id: 093fe75e-44f1-4d3e-94dc-6d258a6dd2d2
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ConfigServiceResourceDeletion.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWSS3
version: 1.0.0
severity: Low
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1d
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
  entityType: IP
queryFrequency: 1d
status: Available
query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus"]);
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in~ (EventNameList)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
  UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
  | extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc  
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
kind: Scheduled
description: |
    'Detects attempts to remove a part of the AWS Config Service.The Threat Actor may manipulate the Config services decrease the visibility into the security posture of an account and / or its workload instances.'
triggerOperator: gt

ARM