Privileged Account Permissions Changed

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Id	0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137
Rulename	Privileged Account Permissions Changed
Description	Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts. Review any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately. Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1078.004
Required data connectors	AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	2d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137.json

KQL

let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
  | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
  | where AssignedRoles contains "admin"
  | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
  AuditLogs
  | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
  | where OperationName has "Add eligible member"
  | extend userPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
  | where tolower(userPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
  | extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
  | extend AddedTo = iif(isnotempty(userPrincipalName), userPrincipalName, Group)
  | extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
  | extend appName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.app)).displayName)
  | extend UPN = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user)).userPrincipalName)
  | extend AddedBy = iif(isnotempty(appName), appName, UPN)
  | mv-expand mod_props
  | where mod_props.displayName == "Role.DisplayName"
  | extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, AddedTo, RoleAdded, AddedBy

YAML

requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
  dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
- connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
  dataTypes:
  - BehaviorAnalytics
triggerOperator: gt
queryFrequency: 1d
name: Privileged Account Permissions Changed
tags:
- AADSecOpsGuide
queryPeriod: 2d
id: 0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137
description: |
  'Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts.
  Review any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately.
  Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'  
severity: Medium
query: |
  let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
    | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
    | where AssignedRoles contains "admin"
    | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
    AuditLogs
    | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
    | where OperationName has "Add eligible member"
    | extend userPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
    | where tolower(userPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
    | extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
    | extend AddedTo = iif(isnotempty(userPrincipalName), userPrincipalName, Group)
    | extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
    | extend appName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.app)).displayName)
    | extend UPN = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user)).userPrincipalName)
    | extend AddedBy = iif(isnotempty(appName), appName, UPN)
    | mv-expand mod_props
    | where mod_props.displayName == "Role.DisplayName"
    | extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))
    | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, AddedTo, RoleAdded, AddedBy  
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: userPrincipalName
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: AddedBy
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
triggerThreshold: 0

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137')]",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137')]",
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "apiVersion": "2022-11-01-preview",
      "properties": {
        "displayName": "Privileged Account Permissions Changed",
        "description": "'Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts.\nReview any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately.\nRef: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'\n",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "enabled": true,
        "query": "let admin_users = (IdentityInfo\n  | where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)\n  | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN\n  | where AssignedRoles contains \"admin\"\n  | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));\n  AuditLogs\n  | where Category =~ \"RoleManagement\"\n  | where OperationName has \"Add eligible member\"\n  | extend userPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)\n  | where tolower(userPrincipalName) in (admin_users)\n  | extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n  | extend AddedTo = iif(isnotempty(userPrincipalName), userPrincipalName, Group)\n  | extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties\n  | extend appName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.app)).displayName)\n  | extend UPN = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user)).userPrincipalName)\n  | extend AddedBy = iif(isnotempty(appName), appName, UPN)\n  | mv-expand mod_props\n  | where mod_props.displayName == \"Role.DisplayName\"\n  | extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))\n  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, AddedTo, RoleAdded, AddedBy\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P2D",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0,
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078.004"
        ],
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137",
        "customDetails": null,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "identifier": "FullName",
                "columnName": "userPrincipalName"
              }
            ],
            "entityType": "Account"
          },
          {
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "identifier": "FullName",
                "columnName": "AddedBy"
              }
            ],
            "entityType": "Account"
          }
        ],
        "tags": [
          "AADSecOpsGuide"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml"
      }
    }
  ]
}