Privileged Account Permissions Changed
Id | 0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137 |
Rulename | Privileged Account Permissions Changed |
Description | Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts. Review any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately. Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | PrivilegeEscalation |
Techniques | T1078.004 |
Required data connectors | AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 2d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml |
Version | 1.0.7 |
Arm template | 0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137.json |
let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
| where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
| where AssignedRoles contains "admin" or GroupMembership has "Admin"
| summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
AuditLogs
| where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
| where OperationName has "Add eligible member"
| extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
| where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
| extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
| extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend RoleAddedTo = iif(isnotempty(TargetUserPrincipalName), TargetUserPrincipalName, Group)
| extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
| extend RoleAddedBy = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, InitiatingUserPrincipalName)
| mv-expand mod_props
| where mod_props.displayName == "Role.DisplayName"
| extend UserAgent = tostring(AdditionalDetails[0].value)
| extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))
| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, TargetUserPrincipalName, RoleAddedTo, RoleAdded, RoleAddedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName
query: |
let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
| where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
| where AssignedRoles contains "admin" or GroupMembership has "Admin"
| summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
AuditLogs
| where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
| where OperationName has "Add eligible member"
| extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
| where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
| extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
| extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend RoleAddedTo = iif(isnotempty(TargetUserPrincipalName), TargetUserPrincipalName, Group)
| extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
| extend RoleAddedBy = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, InitiatingUserPrincipalName)
| mv-expand mod_props
| where mod_props.displayName == "Role.DisplayName"
| extend UserAgent = tostring(AdditionalDetails[0].value)
| extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))
| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, TargetUserPrincipalName, RoleAddedTo, RoleAdded, RoleAddedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName
queryFrequency: 1d
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: TargetUserPrincipalName
- identifier: Name
columnName: TargetAccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: TargetAccountUPNSuffix
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: AadUserId
columnName: TargetAadUserId
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
- identifier: Name
columnName: InitiatingAccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: AadUserId
columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
entityType: Account
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml
queryPeriod: 2d
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.7
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
name: Privileged Account Permissions Changed
triggerThreshold: 0
severity: Medium
tags:
- AADSecOpsGuide
description: |
'Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts.
Review any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AuditLogs
connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
- dataTypes:
- IdentityInfo
connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
id: 0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts.\nReview any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately.\nRef: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'\n",
"displayName": "Privileged Account Permissions Changed",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "TargetUserPrincipalName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "TargetAccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "TargetAccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "TargetAadUserId",
"identifier": "AadUserId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingUserPrincipalName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAadUserId",
"identifier": "AadUserId"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml",
"query": "let admin_users = (IdentityInfo\n | where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)\n | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN\n | where AssignedRoles contains \"admin\" or GroupMembership has \"Admin\"\n | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));\n AuditLogs\n | where Category =~ \"RoleManagement\"\n | where OperationName has \"Add eligible member\"\n | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)\n | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)\n | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)\n | extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n | extend RoleAddedTo = iif(isnotempty(TargetUserPrincipalName), TargetUserPrincipalName, Group)\n | extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties\n | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)\n | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)\n | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)\n | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)\n | extend RoleAddedBy = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, InitiatingUserPrincipalName)\n | mv-expand mod_props\n | where mod_props.displayName == \"Role.DisplayName\"\n | extend UserAgent = tostring(AdditionalDetails[0].value)\n | extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))\n | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[1])\n | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[1])\n | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, TargetUserPrincipalName, RoleAddedTo, RoleAdded, RoleAddedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P2D",
"severity": "Medium",
"subTechniques": [
"T1078.004"
],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"PrivilegeEscalation"
],
"tags": [
"AADSecOpsGuide"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.7",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}