Privileged Account Permissions Changed

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Id	0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137
Rulename	Privileged Account Permissions Changed
Description	Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts. Review any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately. Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1078.004
Required data connectors	AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	2d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml
Version	1.0.7
Arm template	0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137.json

KQL

let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
  | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
  | where AssignedRoles contains "admin" or GroupMembership has "Admin"
  | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
  AuditLogs
  | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
  | where OperationName has "Add eligible member"
  | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
  | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
  | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
  | extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
  | extend RoleAddedTo = iif(isnotempty(TargetUserPrincipalName), TargetUserPrincipalName, Group)
  | extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
  | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
  | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
  | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
  | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
  | extend RoleAddedBy = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, InitiatingUserPrincipalName)
  | mv-expand mod_props
  | where mod_props.displayName == "Role.DisplayName"
  | extend UserAgent = tostring(AdditionalDetails[0].value)
  | extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))
  | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, TargetUserPrincipalName, RoleAddedTo, RoleAdded, RoleAddedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName

YAML

version: 1.0.7
id: 0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137
name: Privileged Account Permissions Changed
queryPeriod: 2d
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
  dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
- connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
  dataTypes:
  - IdentityInfo
tags:
- AADSecOpsGuide
query: |
  let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
    | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
    | where AssignedRoles contains "admin" or GroupMembership has "Admin"
    | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
    AuditLogs
    | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
    | where OperationName has "Add eligible member"
    | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
    | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
    | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
    | extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
    | extend RoleAddedTo = iif(isnotempty(TargetUserPrincipalName), TargetUserPrincipalName, Group)
    | extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
    | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
    | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
    | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
    | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
    | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
    | extend RoleAddedBy = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, InitiatingUserPrincipalName)
    | mv-expand mod_props
    | where mod_props.displayName == "Role.DisplayName"
    | extend UserAgent = tostring(AdditionalDetails[0].value)
    | extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))
    | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
    | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
    | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, TargetUserPrincipalName, RoleAddedTo, RoleAdded, RoleAddedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName  
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: TargetUserPrincipalName
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: TargetAccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: TargetAccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: AadUserId
    columnName: TargetAadUserId
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatingAccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: AadUserId
    columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
triggerThreshold: 0
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
queryFrequency: 1d
description: |
  'Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts.
  Review any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately.
  Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'

ARM