Privileged Account Permissions Changed

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Id	0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137
Rulename	Privileged Account Permissions Changed
Description	Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts. Review any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately. Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1078.004
Required data connectors	AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	2d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml
Version	1.0.7
Arm template	0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137.json

KQL

let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
  | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
  | where AssignedRoles contains "admin" or GroupMembership has "Admin"
  | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
  AuditLogs
  | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
  | where OperationName has "Add eligible member"
  | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
  | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
  | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
  | extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
  | extend RoleAddedTo = iif(isnotempty(TargetUserPrincipalName), TargetUserPrincipalName, Group)
  | extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
  | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
  | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
  | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
  | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
  | extend RoleAddedBy = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, InitiatingUserPrincipalName)
  | mv-expand mod_props
  | where mod_props.displayName == "Role.DisplayName"
  | extend UserAgent = tostring(AdditionalDetails[0].value)
  | extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))
  | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, TargetUserPrincipalName, RoleAddedTo, RoleAdded, RoleAddedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName

YAML

triggerThreshold: 0
queryFrequency: 1d
description: |
  'Detects changes to permissions assigned to admin users. Threat actors may try and increase permission scope by adding additional roles to already privileged accounts.
  Review any modifications to ensure they were made legitimately.
  Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'  
query: |
  let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
    | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
    | where AssignedRoles contains "admin" or GroupMembership has "Admin"
    | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
    AuditLogs
    | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
    | where OperationName has "Add eligible member"
    | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
    | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
    | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
    | extend Group = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
    | extend RoleAddedTo = iif(isnotempty(TargetUserPrincipalName), TargetUserPrincipalName, Group)
    | extend mod_props = TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
    | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
    | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
    | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
    | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
    | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
    | extend RoleAddedBy = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, InitiatingUserPrincipalName)
    | mv-expand mod_props
    | where mod_props.displayName == "Role.DisplayName"
    | extend UserAgent = tostring(AdditionalDetails[0].value)
    | extend RoleAdded = tostring(parse_json(tostring(mod_props.newValue)))
    | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
    | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
    | project-reorder TimeGenerated, OperationName, TargetUserPrincipalName, RoleAddedTo, RoleAdded, RoleAddedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName  
tags:
- AADSecOpsGuide
severity: Medium
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: TargetUserPrincipalName
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: TargetAccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: TargetAccountUPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: AadUserId
    columnName: TargetAadUserId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatingAccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: AadUserId
    columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
  entityType: Account
version: 1.0.7
id: 0433c8a3-9aa6-4577-beef-2ea23be41137
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/PrivilegedAccountPermissionsChanged.yaml
name: Privileged Account Permissions Changed
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
  dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
- connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
  dataTypes:
  - IdentityInfo
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
kind: Scheduled
queryPeriod: 2d

ARM