NOBELIUM - Script payload stored in Registry

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Id	00cb180c-08a8-4e55-a276-63fb1442d5b5
Rulename	NOBELIUM - Script payload stored in Registry
Description	This query idenifies when a process execution commandline indicates that a registry value is written to allow for later execution a malicious script References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1059
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsForwardedEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/NOBELIUM_SuspiciousScriptRegistryWrite.yaml
Version	1.1.2
Arm template	00cb180c-08a8-4e55-a276-63fb1442d5b5.json

KQL

let cmdTokens0 = dynamic(['vbscript','jscript']);
let cmdTokens1 = dynamic(['mshtml','RunHTMLApplication']);
let cmdTokens2 = dynamic(['Execute','CreateObject','RegRead','window.close']);
(union isfuzzy=true 
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where EventID == 4688
| where CommandLine has @'\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion'
| where not(CommandLine has_any (@'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run', @'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'))
// If you are receiving false positives, then it may help to make the query more strict by uncommenting one or both of the lines below to refine the matches
//| where CommandLine has_any (cmdTokens0)
//| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens1)
| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens2)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer, AccountCustomEntity = Account
),
(WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has_all(cmdTokens2) and  EventData has @'\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion'
| where not(EventData has_any (@'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run', @'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'))
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has @'\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion'
| where not(CommandLine has_any (@'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run', @'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'))
// If you are receiving false positives, then it may help to make the query more strict by uncommenting one or both of the lines below to refine the matches
//| where CommandLine has_any (cmdTokens0)
//| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens1)
| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens2)
| extend Account =  strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,"\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)  
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer, AccountCustomEntity = Account))

YAML

name: NOBELIUM - Script payload stored in Registry
query: |
  let cmdTokens0 = dynamic(['vbscript','jscript']);
  let cmdTokens1 = dynamic(['mshtml','RunHTMLApplication']);
  let cmdTokens2 = dynamic(['Execute','CreateObject','RegRead','window.close']);
  (union isfuzzy=true 
  (SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where CommandLine has @'\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion'
  | where not(CommandLine has_any (@'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run', @'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'))
  // If you are receiving false positives, then it may help to make the query more strict by uncommenting one or both of the lines below to refine the matches
  //| where CommandLine has_any (cmdTokens0)
  //| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens1)
  | where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens2)
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer, AccountCustomEntity = Account
  ),
  (WindowsEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
  | where EventID == 4688 and EventData has_all(cmdTokens2) and  EventData has @'\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion'
  | where not(EventData has_any (@'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run', @'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'))
  | extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
  | where CommandLine has @'\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion'
  | where not(CommandLine has_any (@'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run', @'\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'))
  // If you are receiving false positives, then it may help to make the query more strict by uncommenting one or both of the lines below to refine the matches
  //| where CommandLine has_any (cmdTokens0)
  //| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens1)
  | where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens2)
  | extend Account =  strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,"\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)
  | extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
  | extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)  
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer, AccountCustomEntity = Account))  
metadata:
  source:
    kind: Community
  author:
    name: Shain
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Threat Intelligence
  support:
    tier: Community
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/NOBELIUM_SuspiciousScriptRegistryWrite.yaml
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerThreshold: 0
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvents
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - WindowsEvent
  connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
version: 1.1.2
queryPeriod: 1d
id: 00cb180c-08a8-4e55-a276-63fb1442d5b5
triggerOperator: gt
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: AccountCustomEntity
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: HostCustomEntity
  entityType: Host
tags:
- NOBELIUM
relevantTechniques:
- T1059
severity: Medium
description: |
  'This query idenifies when a process execution commandline indicates that a registry value is written to allow for later execution a malicious script
   References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'  
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- Execution

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/00cb180c-08a8-4e55-a276-63fb1442d5b5')]",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/00cb180c-08a8-4e55-a276-63fb1442d5b5')]",
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "apiVersion": "2022-11-01",
      "properties": {
        "displayName": "NOBELIUM - Script payload stored in Registry",
        "description": "'This query idenifies when a process execution commandline indicates that a registry value is written to allow for later execution a malicious script\n References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'\n",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "enabled": true,
        "query": "let cmdTokens0 = dynamic(['vbscript','jscript']);\nlet cmdTokens1 = dynamic(['mshtml','RunHTMLApplication']);\nlet cmdTokens2 = dynamic(['Execute','CreateObject','RegRead','window.close']);\n(union isfuzzy=true \n(SecurityEvent\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where CommandLine has @'\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion'\n| where not(CommandLine has_any (@'\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run', @'\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce'))\n// If you are receiving false positives, then it may help to make the query more strict by uncommenting one or both of the lines below to refine the matches\n//| where CommandLine has_any (cmdTokens0)\n//| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens1)\n| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens2)\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer, AccountCustomEntity = Account\n),\n(WindowsEvent\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)\n| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has_all(cmdTokens2) and  EventData has @'\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion'\n| where not(EventData has_any (@'\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run', @'\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce'))\n| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)\n| where CommandLine has @'\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion'\n| where not(CommandLine has_any (@'\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run', @'\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce'))\n// If you are receiving false positives, then it may help to make the query more strict by uncommenting one or both of the lines below to refine the matches\n//| where CommandLine has_any (cmdTokens0)\n//| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens1)\n| where CommandLine has_all (cmdTokens2)\n| extend Account =  strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,\"\\\\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)\n| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)  \n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostCustomEntity = Computer, AccountCustomEntity = Account))\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0,
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1059"
        ],
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "00cb180c-08a8-4e55-a276-63fb1442d5b5",
        "customDetails": null,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "identifier": "FullName",
                "columnName": "AccountCustomEntity"
              }
            ],
            "entityType": "Account"
          },
          {
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "identifier": "FullName",
                "columnName": "HostCustomEntity"
              }
            ],
            "entityType": "Host"
          }
        ],
        "tags": [
          "NOBELIUM"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.1.2",
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/NOBELIUM_SuspiciousScriptRegistryWrite.yaml"
      }
    }
  ]
}