Privilege escalation via EC2 policy

AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:RunInstances") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:Run*")) or (Action contains "ec2:*") or (Action contains "ec2:ListInstances" and Action contains "ec2:StartInstance" and Action contains "ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute") or (Action contains "ec2:List*" and Action contains "ec2:Start*" and Action contains "ec2:Modify*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

triggerOperator: gt
queryFrequency: 1d
description: |
    'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on EC2 policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'
status: Available
kind: Scheduled
triggerThreshold: 0
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
version: 1.0.1
queryPeriod: 1d
name: Privilege escalation via EC2 policy
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaEC2Policy.yaml
id: a2b2a984-c820-4d93-830e-139bffd81fa3
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
severity: Medium
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
  entityType: IP
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
    | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
    | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
    | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
    | mvexpand Statement
    | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
    | extend Action = tostring(Action)
    | where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:RunInstances") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:Run*")) or (Action contains "ec2:*") or (Action contains "ec2:ListInstances" and Action contains "ec2:StartInstance" and Action contains "ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute") or (Action contains "ec2:List*" and Action contains "ec2:Start*" and Action contains "ec2:Modify*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
    | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
    | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
    | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
    | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
      AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
    | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
    | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/a2b2a984-c820-4d93-830e-139bffd81fa3')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/a2b2a984-c820-4d93-830e-139bffd81fa3')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "a2b2a984-c820-4d93-830e-139bffd81fa3",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on EC2 policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'\n",
        "displayName": "Privilege escalation via EC2 policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaEC2Policy.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n  | where EventName in (\"PutUserPolicy\",\"PutRolePolicy\",\"PutGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)\n  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement\n  | mvexpand Statement\n  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)\n  | extend Action = tostring(Action)\n  | where Effect =~ \"Allow\" and ((((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"ec2:*\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"ec2:RunInstances\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"ec2:Run*\")) or (Action contains \"ec2:*\") or (Action contains \"ec2:ListInstances\" and Action contains \"ec2:StartInstance\" and Action contains \"ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute\") or (Action contains \"ec2:List*\" and Action contains \"ec2:Start*\" and Action contains \"ec2:Modify*\")) and Resource == \"*\" and Condition == \"\"\n  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix\n  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}