GitLab - User Impersonation
Id | 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40 |
Rulename | GitLab - User Impersonation |
Description | This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or repository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation. |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | Persistence |
Techniques | T1078 |
Required data connectors | Syslog |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1h |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml |
Version | 1.0.0 |
Arm template | 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40.json |
let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');
let impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');
impersonationStart
| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID
| where EventTime1 > EventTime
| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName
| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName
| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime
triggerOperator: gt
queryFrequency: 1h
description: |
'This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or
repository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation.'
status: Available
kind: Scheduled
triggerThreshold: 0
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: Syslog
dataTypes:
- Syslog
version: 1.0.0
queryPeriod: 1d
name: GitLab - User Impersonation
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml
id: 0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40
tactics:
- Persistence
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
severity: Medium
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: IPStart
entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: IPStop
entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: EntityName
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: TargetDetails
entityType: Account
query: |
let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');
let impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit
| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');
impersonationStart
| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID
| where EventTime1 > EventTime
| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName
| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName
| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "0f4f16a2-b464-4c10-9a42-993da3e15a40",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This queries GitLab Audit Logs for user impersonation. A malicious operator or a compromised admin account could leverage the impersonation feature of GitLab to change code or\nrepository settings bypassing usual processes. This hunting queries allows you to track the audit actions done under impersonation.'\n",
"displayName": "GitLab - User Impersonation",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPStart",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPStop",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "EntityName",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "TargetDetails",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/GitLab/Analytic Rules/GitLab_Impersonation.yaml",
"query": "let impersonationStart = (GitLabAudit\n| where CustomMessage == 'Started Impersonation');\nlet impersonationStop = (GitLabAudit\n| where CustomMessage == 'Stopped Impersonation');\nimpersonationStart\n| join kind=inner impersonationStop on $left.TargetID == $right.TargetID and $left.AuthorID == $right.AuthorID \n| where EventTime1 > EventTime\n| extend TimeGenerated, AuthorID, AuthorName, TargetID, TargetDetails = TargetDetails, IPStart = IPAddress, IPStop = IPAddress1, ImpStartTime = EventTime, ImpStopTime = EventTime1, EntityName\n| join kind=inner (GitLabAudit | extend ActionTime = EventTime, AuthorName) on $left.TargetDetails == $right.AuthorName \n| where ImpStartTime < ActionTime and ActionTime > ImpStopTime\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Persistence"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.0",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}