Match Legitimate Name or Location - 2
Id | dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31 |
Rulename | Match Legitimate Name or Location - 2 |
Description | Attackers often match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files to avoid detection rules that are based trust of certain operating system processes. This query detects mismatches in the parent-child relationship of core operating system processes to uncover different masquerading attempts. |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | DefenseEvasion |
Techniques | T1036.005 |
Required data connectors | MicrosoftThreatProtection |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1h |
Query period | 1h |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/MatchLegitimateNameOrLocation.yaml |
Version | 1.0.0 |
Arm template | dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31.json |
let ProcessRelations=datatable(ImageFile:string,ExpectedParent:dynamic) [
"smss.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe", "ntoskrnl.exe", ""]),
"crmss.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"wininit.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"winlogon.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"services.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"lsaiso.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"lsass.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"spoolsv.exe", dynamic(["services.exe"]),
"dllhost.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe", "services.exe"]),
"lsm.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"svchost.exe", dynamic(["services.exe", "msmpeng.exe"]),
"runtimebroker.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe"]),
"taskhostw.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe"]),
"userinit.exe", dynamic(["winlogon.exe"])
// Explorer can have a lot of parents in some environments
//,"explorer.exe", dynamic(["userinit.exe"])
];
DeviceProcessEvents
| extend ImageFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(FolderPath)).Filename))
| extend ParentFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(InitiatingProcessFolderPath)).Filename))
| lookup kind=inner ProcessRelations on ImageFile
| where not(set_has_element(ExpectedParent,ParentFile))
severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1036.005
queryFrequency: 1h
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.0
name: Match Legitimate Name or Location - 2
triggerOperator: gt
description: |
Attackers often match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files to avoid detection rules that are based trust of certain operating system processes.
This query detects mismatches in the parent-child relationship of core operating system processes to uncover different masquerading attempts.
queryPeriod: 1h
query: |
let ProcessRelations=datatable(ImageFile:string,ExpectedParent:dynamic) [
"smss.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe", "ntoskrnl.exe", ""]),
"crmss.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"wininit.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"winlogon.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"services.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"lsaiso.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"lsass.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"spoolsv.exe", dynamic(["services.exe"]),
"dllhost.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe", "services.exe"]),
"lsm.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"svchost.exe", dynamic(["services.exe", "msmpeng.exe"]),
"runtimebroker.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe"]),
"taskhostw.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe"]),
"userinit.exe", dynamic(["winlogon.exe"])
// Explorer can have a lot of parents in some environments
//,"explorer.exe", dynamic(["userinit.exe"])
];
DeviceProcessEvents
| extend ImageFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(FolderPath)).Filename))
| extend ParentFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(InitiatingProcessFolderPath)).Filename))
| lookup kind=inner ProcessRelations on ImageFile
| where not(set_has_element(ExpectedParent,ParentFile))
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- columnName: DeviceName
identifier: FullName
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: AccountSid
identifier: Sid
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountDomain
identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: Process
fieldMappings:
- columnName: ProcessCommandLine
identifier: CommandLine
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
status: Available
triggerThreshold: 0
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/MatchLegitimateNameOrLocation.yaml
id: dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- DeviceProcessEvents
connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "Attackers often match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files to avoid detection rules that are based trust of certain operating system processes.\nThis query detects mismatches in the parent-child relationship of core operating system processes to uncover different masquerading attempts.\n",
"displayName": "Match Legitimate Name or Location - 2",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "DeviceName",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountSid",
"identifier": "Sid"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Process",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "ProcessCommandLine",
"identifier": "CommandLine"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/MatchLegitimateNameOrLocation.yaml",
"query": "let ProcessRelations=datatable(ImageFile:string,ExpectedParent:dynamic) [\n \"smss.exe\", dynamic([\"smss.exe\", \"ntoskrnl.exe\", \"\"]),\n \"crmss.exe\", dynamic([\"smss.exe\"]),\n \"wininit.exe\", dynamic([\"smss.exe\"]),\n \"winlogon.exe\", dynamic([\"smss.exe\"]),\n \"services.exe\", dynamic([\"wininit.exe\"]),\n \"lsaiso.exe\", dynamic([\"wininit.exe\"]),\n \"lsass.exe\", dynamic([\"wininit.exe\"]),\n \"spoolsv.exe\", dynamic([\"services.exe\"]),\n \"dllhost.exe\", dynamic([\"svchost.exe\", \"services.exe\"]),\n \"lsm.exe\", dynamic([\"wininit.exe\"]),\n \"svchost.exe\", dynamic([\"services.exe\", \"msmpeng.exe\"]),\n \"runtimebroker.exe\", dynamic([\"svchost.exe\"]),\n \"taskhostw.exe\", dynamic([\"svchost.exe\"]),\n \"userinit.exe\", dynamic([\"winlogon.exe\"])\n // Explorer can have a lot of parents in some environments\n //,\"explorer.exe\", dynamic([\"userinit.exe\"])\n];\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| extend ImageFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(FolderPath)).Filename))\n| extend ParentFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(InitiatingProcessFolderPath)).Filename))\n| lookup kind=inner ProcessRelations on ImageFile\n| where not(set_has_element(ExpectedParent,ParentFile))\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"DefenseEvasion"
],
"techniques": [
"T1036"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.0",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}