Login to AWS Management Console without MFA
Id | d25b1998-a592-4bc5-8a3a-92b39eedb1bc |
Rulename | Login to AWS Management Console without MFA |
Description | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA. You can limit this detection to trigger for adminsitrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts. This is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful. |
Severity | Low |
Tactics | DefenseEvasion PrivilegeEscalation Persistence InitialAccess |
Techniques | T1078 |
Required data connectors | AWS AWSS3 |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ConsoleLogonWithoutMFA.yaml |
Version | 1.0.5 |
Arm template | d25b1998-a592-4bc5-8a3a-92b39eedb1bc.json |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin), indexId = indexof(tostring(UserIdentityPrincipalid),":")
| where MFAUsed !~ "Yes" and LoginResult !~ "Failure"
| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains "AWSReservedSSO"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, indexId
| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
queryPeriod: 1d
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
- InitialAccess
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
connectorId: AWS
- dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
connectorId: AWSS3
triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
entityType: IP
name: Login to AWS Management Console without MFA
status: Available
query: |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin), indexId = indexof(tostring(UserIdentityPrincipalid),":")
| where MFAUsed !~ "Yes" and LoginResult !~ "Failure"
| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains "AWSReservedSSO"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, indexId
| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc
queryFrequency: 1d
id: d25b1998-a592-4bc5-8a3a-92b39eedb1bc
severity: Low
description: |
'Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA.
You can limit this detection to trigger for adminsitrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts.
This is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful.'
version: 1.0.5
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ConsoleLogonWithoutMFA.yaml
kind: Scheduled
triggerOperator: gt
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d25b1998-a592-4bc5-8a3a-92b39eedb1bc')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d25b1998-a592-4bc5-8a3a-92b39eedb1bc')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "d25b1998-a592-4bc5-8a3a-92b39eedb1bc",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA.\nYou can limit this detection to trigger for adminsitrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts.\nThis is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful.'\n",
"displayName": "Login to AWS Management Console without MFA",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
},
{
"columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
"identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ConsoleLogonWithoutMFA.yaml",
"query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName =~ \"ConsoleLogin\"\n| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin), indexId = indexof(tostring(UserIdentityPrincipalid),\":\")\n| where MFAUsed !~ \"Yes\" and LoginResult !~ \"Failure\"\n| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains \"AWSReservedSSO\"\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,\nUserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, indexId\n| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "Low",
"status": "Available",
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"DefenseEvasion",
"InitialAccess",
"Persistence",
"PrivilegeEscalation"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.5",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}