AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider | Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules

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Id	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
Rulename	AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider
Description	Detects updates to AWS SAML identity provider configuration. Unauthorized changes can allow adversaries to issue trusted federation tokens and gain persistent or privileged access.
Severity	High
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1078
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
Version	1.0.2
Arm template	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

YAML

queryFrequency: 1d
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
triggerThreshold: 0
triggerOperator: gt
severity: High
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: AWS SAML identity provider updated by {{AccountName}}
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected UpdateSAMLProvider from {{SourceIpAddress}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
tactics:
- Persistence
queryPeriod: 1d
customDetails:
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
  EventSource: EventSource
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
  EventName: EventName
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
id: bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.2
description: |
  Detects updates to AWS SAML identity provider configuration. Unauthorized changes can allow adversaries to
  issue trusted federation tokens and gain persistent or privileged access.
status: Available
name: AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected UpdateSAMLProvider from {{SourceIpAddress}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS SAML identity provider updated by {{AccountName}}"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496",
        "customDetails": {
          "AWSRegion": "AWSRegion",
          "EventName": "EventName",
          "EventSource": "EventSource",
          "UserIdentityArn": "UserIdentityArn"
        },
        "description": "Detects updates to AWS SAML identity provider configuration. Unauthorized changes can allow adversaries to\nissue trusted federation tokens and gain persistent or privileged access.\n",
        "displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName == \"UpdateSAMLProvider\" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}