SAML update identity provider

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Id	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
Rulename	SAML update identity provider
Description	Attackers could update the SAML provider in order to create unauthorized but valid tokens and represent them to services that trust SAML tokens from the environment. These tokens can then be used to access resources. More about this API at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateSAMLProvider.html
Severity	High
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1078
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

YAML

entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
severity: High
name: SAML update identity provider
triggerThreshold: 0
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
id: bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
kind: Scheduled
status: Available
queryFrequency: 1d
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
description: |
    'Attackers could update the SAML provider in order to create unauthorized but valid tokens and represent them to services that trust SAML tokens from the environment. These tokens can then be used to access resources. More about this API at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateSAMLProvider.html '
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
version: 1.0.1
tactics:
- Persistence
queryPeriod: 1d
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS

ARM