Suspicious Powershell Commandlet Executed

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Id	b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d
Rulename	Suspicious Powershell Commandlet Executed
Description	This analytic rule detects when a suspicious PowerShell commandlet is executed on a host. Threat actors often use PowerShell to execute commands and scripts to move laterally, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate data.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1059
Required data connectors	MicrosoftThreatProtection
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/SuspiciousPowerShellCommandExecuted.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d.json

KQL

// Adjust the list of suspicious commandlets as needed
let SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList = dynamic(["Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy",
  "Get-DomainPolicy",
  "Get-DomainUser",
  "Get-DomainComputer",
  "Get-DomainController",
  "Get-DomainGroup",
  "Get-DomainTrust",
  "Get-ADTrust",
  "Get-ForestTrust"
  ]);
DeviceEvents
| where ActionType == "PowerShellCommand"
| extend Commandlet = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).Command)
| where Commandlet has_any (SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend Username = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[1])
| extend DvcHostname = tostring(split(DeviceName, '.')[0]), DvcDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))

YAML

severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1059
queryFrequency: 1h
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.1
name: Suspicious Powershell Commandlet Executed
triggerOperator: gt
description: |
    This analytic rule detects when a suspicious PowerShell commandlet is executed on a host. Threat actors often use PowerShell to execute commands and scripts to move laterally, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate data.
queryPeriod: 1h
query: |
  // Adjust the list of suspicious commandlets as needed
  let SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList = dynamic(["Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy",
    "Get-DomainPolicy",
    "Get-DomainUser",
    "Get-DomainComputer",
    "Get-DomainController",
    "Get-DomainGroup",
    "Get-DomainTrust",
    "Get-ADTrust",
    "Get-ForestTrust"
    ]);
  DeviceEvents
  | where ActionType == "PowerShellCommand"
  | extend Commandlet = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).Command)
  | where Commandlet has_any (SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList)
  | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
  | extend Username = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[1])
  | extend DvcHostname = tostring(split(DeviceName, '.')[0]), DvcDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))  
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Suspicious PowerShell Commandlet Executed on {{DvcHostname}} ({{LocalIP}}) by ({{InitiatingProcessAccountUpn}})
  alertDescriptionFormat: "Suspicious PowerShell Commandlet by Process '{{InitiatingProcessFileName}}' ProcessId: '{{InitiatingProcessId}}' with commandline {{InitiatingProcessCommandLine}} was executed."
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: DvcHostname
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: DvcDomain
    identifier: DnsDomain
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: LocalIP
    identifier: Address
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Username
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: UPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: Process
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessId
    identifier: ProcessId
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessCommandLine
    identifier: CommandLine
tactics:
- Execution
status: Available
triggerThreshold: 0
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/SuspiciousPowerShellCommandExecuted.yaml
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
id: b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - DeviceEvents
  connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Suspicious PowerShell Commandlet by Process '{{InitiatingProcessFileName}}' ProcessId: '{{InitiatingProcessId}}' with commandline {{InitiatingProcessCommandLine}} was executed.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "Suspicious PowerShell Commandlet Executed on {{DvcHostname}} ({{LocalIP}}) by ({{InitiatingProcessAccountUpn}})"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "This analytic rule detects when a suspicious PowerShell commandlet is executed on a host. Threat actors often use PowerShell to execute commands and scripts to move laterally, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate data.\n",
        "displayName": "Suspicious Powershell Commandlet Executed",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "DvcHostname",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "DvcDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "LocalIP",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Username",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "UPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Process",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessId",
                "identifier": "ProcessId"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessCommandLine",
                "identifier": "CommandLine"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "eventGroupingSettings": {
          "aggregationKind": "AlertPerResult"
        },
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/SuspiciousPowerShellCommandExecuted.yaml",
        "query": "// Adjust the list of suspicious commandlets as needed\nlet SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList = dynamic([\"Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy\",\n  \"Get-DomainPolicy\",\n  \"Get-DomainUser\",\n  \"Get-DomainComputer\",\n  \"Get-DomainController\",\n  \"Get-DomainGroup\",\n  \"Get-DomainTrust\",\n  \"Get-ADTrust\",\n  \"Get-ForestTrust\"\n  ]);\nDeviceEvents\n| where ActionType == \"PowerShellCommand\"\n| extend Commandlet = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).Command)\n| where Commandlet has_any (SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList)\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine\n| extend Username = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[1])\n| extend DvcHostname = tostring(split(DeviceName, '.')[0]), DvcDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1059"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}